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I. INTRODUCTION
This article attempts to answer the formidable question: When,
if ever, can the state intervene in the life of a pregnant woman to
curtail abuse or neglect of her unborn child? There is no clear an-
swer to this difficult socio-legal question. Opinion varies from
never to as often as need be to protect the fetus. Both extremes are
eschewed here in favor of the thesis that intervention is legally
permissible, but only in a narrow range of cases.
The article begins with discussion of the legal status of the un-
born child and the state's interest in the unborn. It then moves to
a description of state statutes on abuse and neglect. The argument
is made that these statutes should be interpreted to provide pro-
tection for the unborn. This discussion is followed by analysis of
the substantial body of law concerning court ordered medical care
for children over parental objection. Development of this topic is
relevant because state intervention to protect the unborn will often
take the form of court imposed medical or surgical care. Nonmedi-
cal care forms of prenatal abuse and neglect are also discussed.
The focus of the article then shifts to discussion of the rights of
the parties involved in prenatal neglect cases - the rights of par-
ents, the specific interests of the pregnant woman, paternal rights,
and the rights of the unborn child. The article concludes with the
argument that when the varying interests are balanced, the scale
tips, in some cases, toward state intervention to protect viable fetal
life from abuse or neglect.
1984
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II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNBORN CHILD
To set the stage for discussion of the question posed above, this
section briefly outlines areas of substantive law concerning the un-
born. It is interesting to note that the law has been concerned with
the unborn child for centuries. This is especially so in the fields of
property and inheritance, tort, criminal law, and guardianship.
A. Property and Inheritance
The unborn enjoyed certain "rights" as long ago as the Roman
Empire. Under Roman law the fetus was deemed born if it was in
its interest to do so.1 For example, so long as it was born alive, the
fetus "took the status of the father and could inherit equally with
other children."'2 English common law was quite similar in its
treatment of the unborn. Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries
that
[a]n infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law
to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surren-
der of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it;
and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards
by such limitation, as if it were then actually born.
3
In a footnote accompanying this passage, Blackstone states that
"[e]very legitimate infant in ventre de sa mere is considered as
born for all beneficial purposes.' 4 It is apparent that early law was
designed not so much to extend legal rights to the unborn as to
fulfill the dispositional intentions of propertied individuals. While
1. Curran, An Historical Perspective on the Law of Personality and Status with Spe-
cial Regard to the Human Fetus and the Rights of Women, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND
Q./HBLTH AND Socry 58, 59 (1983). Professor Curran describes Roman law as follows:
The human fetus was not regarded as a legal subject but as merely a part of a
woman's body. The fetus had the potential to become a person and the law adopted
the "fiction" . . . that the unborn person be deemed born whenever it was in the
interest to do so. This fiction could be maintained, however, only if the fetus was
later born alive and survived to be recognized as a juristic person.
The most important applications of this law took place when the father died before
the birth of the child. The child nevertheless took the status of the father and could
inherit equally with other children....
Id. at 59-60.
The concept of the fetus "as merely a part of a woman's body" is reflected in the 1884
decision Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884), where the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held there could be no recovery for tortiously inflicted
injury to a fetus. See infra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
2. Curran, supra note 1, at 60.
3. 1 W. BLAcKsTo z, COMmewIrAlms *130 (footnotes omitted).
4. Id. at *130 n.(13).
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the focus was not squarely on the interests of the fetus, there is no
question that the common law recognized and enforced legal rights
relating to the unborn.5
In the United States, early cases dealing with the unborn fol-
lowed the English common law.6 The English fiction that the fetus
born alive was deemed born while in utero retained its viability.
The American development is succinctly summarized in In re
Holthausen's Will:
7
It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law courts in
respect to estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a child
in ventre sa mere is "born" and "alive" for all purposes for his benefit.8
5. For a discussion of the law of inheritance relating to the unborn, see generally Le-
now, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as Person?, 9 Am. J.L. & MEDICINE 1, 3-4
(1983)("Fetal rights were first recognized in property law. At common law a fetus, from the
time of conception, could be named an heir to a decedent's estate. The unborn child's prop-
erty rights, however, only vested upon live birth. .. ."); Parness & Pritchard, To Be Or Not
To Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. Cmi. L. Rzv. 257, 264-67 (1982);
Shaw & Damme, Legal Status of the Fetus, in GRHNrcs AND THE LAw 4 (A. Milunsky & G.
Annas eds. 1976); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsis-
tencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW 349, 351-54 (1971).
The 1798 English Chancery case of Thellusson v. Woodford 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798)
asked the question "Why should not children en ventre sa mere be considered generally as
in existence? They are entitled to all the privileges of other persons." Id. at 164. In response
to the assertion that the fetus was a non-entity, the court quipped:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery, though it is
for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may be an executor. He may
take under the Statute of Distributions.... He may take by devise. He may be enti-
tled under a charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction; and he may have
a guardian.
Id. at 163. This early opinion demonstrates that property law has long recognized the un-
born child as a person entitled to the law's protection.
6. Note, supra note 5, at 352. A nineteenth century treatise on American law states
that
[a]n infant in ventre sa mere, is a child in its mother's womb, and for the benefit of
the child the civil law reputes an infant in its mother's womb in the same condition
as if born .... It is also well settled, both in England and in this country, that an
infant in ventre sa mere is deemed to be in esse, or in being, for the purpose of taking
a remainder, or any other estate or interest which is for his benefit, whether by dis-
sent, devise, or under the statute of distribution.
[B]y the law of England, a child in ventre sa mere may be vouched; is capable of
taking; the mother may detain charters in its behalf; a bill may be brought in its
behalf; a court of equity will grant an injunction in its favor to stay waste; and the
destruction of the child is murder.
R. TYLFR, COMMENTAMES ON Tm LAw OF INFANCY §§ 151, at 223-24; 153, at 225 (1868). See
also P. BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFACY AND COVmlaTURw 104-06 (1849); G. FIELD, THE LEGAL
REATIONS OF INFANTS, PARENT AND CHILD, GuARDIAN AN WARD (1849).
7. 175 Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
8. Id. at 1024, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
Duquesne Law Review
The common law tradition of the "rights" of the unborn was codi-
fied in the Uniform Probate Code, which states that "[r]elatives of
the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit
as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent."9
In the law of property and inheritance, the unborn child has long
been recognized as a person. While its rights are certainly not con-
terminous with those of individuals already born, they are substan-
tial and of ancient origin.
B. Tort
Tort law relating to the unborn has changed remarkably during
the past hundred years.10 A century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, while sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, authored the famous opinion in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton." A pregnant woman slipped and fell "upon a defect
in a highway of the defendant town. ' 12 The fall resulted in a mis-
carriage of her four to five month old fetus, who died moments
after birth. The child's administrator brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against the town. In denying recovery, Justice Holmes wrote
that "as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of
the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be recov-
ered for at all was recoverable by"'3 the mother. The Dietrich deci-
sion became the foundation for a general rule denying recovery for
9. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969). See 26A C.J.S. Descent & Distribution §
29 (1956) which summarizes the law as follows:
Both at common law and under the statutes of the different states, posthumous
children take as heirs and distributees, an infant being deemed in esse for the pur-
pose of taking an estate for its benefit, from the time of conception, provided it is
born alive, and after such a period of foetal existence that its continuance in life may
be reasonably expected, or is born within such a period of time as to indicate that it
was conceived before the death of intestate, [sic] it being essential, under some stat-
utes, that the child be born within ten months after the death of the intestate.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) ("unborn children
have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolu-
tion of property").
10. See Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L.
REv. 131, 131-41 (1979); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for In-
jury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978
DuKE L.J. 1401, 1404-13; Comment, Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There a Limit?
6 FORDHAM URw. L.J. 217 (1977). See also Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?". An Analysis of a
Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 325 (1984); Goichman & Hirsh, The Expanding Rights of the Fetus: An Evolution Not
a Revolution, 30 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 212 (1983).
11. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
12. 138 Mass. at 14, 52 Am. Rep. at 242.
13. 138 Mass. at 17, 52 Am. Rep. at 245.
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injury to an unborn child."
With little dissent,1 the Dietrich Rule went unchallenged until
1946, when the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia decided the seminal case of Bonbrest v. Kotz. 6 In Bon-
brest, a viable fetus was injured through the alleged negligence of
two physicians.1 7 Relying in part on Dietrich, the doctors moved
for summary judgment. The court denied the motion and held that
when direct tortious injury is inflicted on a viable fetus later born
alive, the child may then recover. The court placed decisive em-
phasis on the fact that the fetus was viable at the time of injury,"
reasoning that viability was a precondition to recovery in such
cases. Bonbrest is generally regarded as a repudiation of Justice
Holmes' time-honored denial of a cause of action for prenatal inju-
ries,'9 and since the decision "there has been an all but universal
14. For a discussion of the Dietrich rule see Morrison, supra note 10, at 134-41; Rob-
ertson, supra note 10, at 1404-13.
English common law did not recognize a cause of action for prenatal tortious injury. Mor-
rison, supra note 10, at 133-34 states that
[wile the common law generally recognized the property rights of the unborn, and
the unborn were often protected under the criminal law, there appears to have been
no concomitant civil recognition of their rights as victims of personal injury or death.
Though at least one English court went so far as to write that children en ventre sa
mere "are entitled to all the privileges of other persons," it does not appear that any
case of the English common law ever allowed a civil recovery for personal, rather than
property, injury to the unborn. This failure of the common law to report even a single
case permitting a recovery for prenatal injury was later used as a proof that the com-
mon law had rejected the notion, for surely facts raising the question must have
presented themselves at some time to the common law for consideration.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. In 1900 the Ilinois Supreme Court decided Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 I.
359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415 I. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). The
court relied on the Dietrich rule to deny a cause of action for prenatal tortious injury. Jus-
tice Carroll L. Boggs dissented. He would have allowed a cause of action for tortious injury
to a viable fetus. His dissenting opinion is discussed in detail in Morrison, supra note 10, at
136-37; Robertson, supra note 10, at 1404-09. Most scholarly comment disagreed with the
Dietrich rule. See authorities cited at W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 336 n.22 (4th ed. 1971).
16. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). The case is discussed in Morrison, supra note 10, at
138-41; Robertson, supra note 10, at 1411-12. See also HANDLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH
CASEs, 345-46 (W. Winborne ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as HANDLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH
CASES], where it is stated that "in Bonbrest . . . a court for the first time recognized a
common law right of action for prenatal injuries. The Bonbrest decision . . . reasoned that
an infant should be recognized as having a legal existence separate from its mother's at such
time as it was capable of sustaining life separate from her."
17. The infant's father brought action against two physicians for alleged medical mal-
practice in connection with the child birth. 65 F. Supp. at 139.
18. Id. at 140.
19. See Morrison, supra note 10, at 138-41; HANDLING PREGNANCY & BRTH CASES,
supra note 16, at 346. See also Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 350, 367
N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (1977).
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change in the rule '20 denying recovery for pre-birth injury. The
Reporter of the Second Restatement of Torts observed that
"[t]here now appears to be no American jurisdiction with a deci-
sion still standing refusing recovery. 2' Dean Prosser wrote that
[b]eginning with [Bonbrest], a rapid series of cases, many of them expressly
overruling prior holdings, have brought about what was up till that time the
most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history
of the law of torts.
2
2
While Bonbrest limited recovery to injuries to a viable fetus,
more recent opinions reject viability as a cutoff point for liability
because it is an irrational dividing line.28  Damages are now
awarded for injury suffered at any point during gestation. 4 The
Second Restatement adopts this position, and states that "[o]ne
who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liabil-
ity to the child for the harm if the child is born alive.
'25
20. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 869 comment a. (1977).
21. Id. § 869 Reporter's Note, at 79.
22. W. PRossEa, LAw OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
23. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
See also Morrison, supra note 10, at 141-44; Robertson, supra note 10, at 1414-20; HAN-
DLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH CASES, supra note 16, at 347-48. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869 rejects viability as a cut off for liability, reading as follows:
Harm to Unborn Child
(1) One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the
child for the harm if the child is born alive.
(2) If the child is not born alive, there is no liability unless the applicable wrongful
death statute so provides.
Id. The comments explain the viability rule as follows:
The rule stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to unborn children who are "viable"
at the time of the original injury, that is, capable of independent life, if only in an
incubator. If the tortious conduct and the legal causation of the harm can be satisfac-
torily established, there may be recovery for any injury occurring at any time after
conception. It is obvious, however, that in the present state of medical knowledge of
embryology, as we approach the beginning of pregnancy medical testimony in proof
of a causal connection becomes increasingly uncertain and tends to become mere con-
jecture. For that reason a court may properly require more in the way of convincing
evidence of causation when the injury is claimed to have occurred during the early
weeks of pregnancy than when it comes later. This is not a matter of viability, nor is
there any fixed and definite line to be drawn at any particular state of development
of the foetus.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869, comment d. For discussion of the requirement of
live birth, see Robertson, supra note 10, at 1420-34.
24. It has been held that an injured fetus later born alive may recover for wrongful
acts occurring even prior to conception. See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir.
1978); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); Jorgensen v.
Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Robertson, supra note 10,
at 1435-39.
25. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1977).
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The developments in tort law reflect a growing social awareness
of the individuality of the unborn child. Since the later-born fetus
must bear the burden of another's wrongful act to the same extent
as an individual injured following birth, it seems just and rational
to apply similar rules of civil liability in both cases.2 6
26. The field of tort law relating to the unborn is changing rapidly. The brief textual
outline is not intended to cover all developments. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 270-
71 summarize the principle areas of development as follows:
[T]hree general types of tort claims can be distinguished on the basis of the harm to
the unborn that results from the tortious action. Survival and wrongful death actions
may exist where the harm resulting from a tort is that the fetus is not born alive. A
wrongful life action may exist where the resulting harm is that the fetus is born.
Finally, a standard or traditional common law tort action may exist where the child,
though born, is injured or unhealthy.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
For discussion of prenatal wrongful death see HANDLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH CASES,
supra note 16, at 350-61; Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade,
45 Mo. L. Rzv. 639 (1980); Lenow, supra note 5, at 5-8; Shaw & Damme, supra 5, at 4-5;
Morrison, supra note 10, at 144-53; Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 272-75; Robert-
son, supra note 10, at 1420-34. See also Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d
748 (1976) (case containing excellent history of development of tort law). See the excellent
concurring opinion of Judge Lottinger in Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So.2d 1019, 1031 (La. Ct.
App. 1980) (Lottinger, J., concurring), a case recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
death of a fetus, where the judge states:
The anomalies which exist under the present state of the law are reason enough to
allow the action sued for here. Under existing jurisprudence, a fetus injured or de-
formed by the act of a tortfeasor can sue for its prenatal injuries if it emerges from
the womb alive. If it lives for 10 days or 10 minutes or even 10 seconds outside the
womb, its survivors can sue not only for the fetus' prenatal injuries and post-birth
suffering but also for their own damages suffered as a result of the child's wrongful
death. But under the law as it stands today, a nine-month-old fetus which emerges
stillborn because of a tortfeasor's negligence is considered a nonentity, a nothing, a
mass of lifeless matter for which no wrongful death recovery whatsoever is allowed.
This anomalous state of affairs, carried on in modern times by the legal fiction of
antiquity, can no longer be justified.
Id. The torts of wrongful birth and wrongful life are sometimes confused with each other.
Morrison, supra note 10, at 161-62 describes the difference:
"Wrongful birth" refers to suits brought by parents for damages related to the birth
and/or rearing of an unwanted or defective child, which but for the defendant's
wrongful conduct would never have been born. In "wrongful life" the plaintiff is the
infant who is born because of the defendant's wrongful. conduct. The plaintiff con-
tends that rather than having been born defective, it would have been better to have
never been born at all, i.e., the utter void of nonexistence would be preferable to
defective life. (footnotes omitted).
Id. For discussion of wrongful life see HANDLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH CASES, supra note 16,
at 393-419; Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 275-81; Morrison, supra note 10, at 161-
63; Robertson, supra note 10, at 1439-55; Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recogni-
tion of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 473 (1983).
For discussion of wrongful birth see HANDLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH CASES, supra note 16,
at 372-93; Morrison, supra note 10, at 153-61.
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C. Criminal Law
Killing a fetus has long been subject to criminal sanction. 7 The
issue arises in the contexts of criminal abortion and injury to the
woman resulting in fetal death. The common law of abortion
placed great emphasis on whether the fetus was quick,28 and
whether it was born alive prior to death. In an oft-quoted passage,
Sir Edward Coke stated that:
[i]f a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and
she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and no murder;
but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other
cause, this is murder .... 29
Professors Perkins and Boyce reiterate the common law by stating
that "it was a common-law misdemeanor to administer any drug or
medicine or to perform an operation on a woman pregnant with a
quick child for the purpose of causing a miscarriage."30 The crime
was elevated to murder if the child was born alive but subse-
quently died of its prenatal injuries.3 Another commentator points
out that if the fetus was not quick at the time of injury, "killing
the fetus while still within the womb, or causing its death after
birth alive was not, at common law, an indictable offense. . . . It
was not a crime at all."' 2
27. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 267.
28. The term "quick" is defined as "[tlhe signs of life felt by the mother as a result of
the fetal movements, usually noted first in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy."
STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, FIrrH UNABRIDGED LAWYERS' EDITION 1183 (1982). See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132, 134 (1973). See also Means, The Law of New York Con-
cerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitu-
tionality, 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 411, 419-22 (1968). The author presents a thorough historical
overview of the law of abortion and related matters.
29. 3 COKE, INsTrruTES *5 (1648).
30. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 188 (3d ed. 1982).
31. Id. at 50.
32. Means, supra note 28, at 420, describes the early law of abortion as follows:
Both the early and the mature manifestations of the English common law distin-
guish between abortion in early pregnancy and abortion later in pregnancy. The lat-
ter was regarded as murder by the early common law, as it was by canon law. By
Coke's time, the common law regarded abortion as murder only if the foetus is (1)
quickened, (2) born alive, (3) lives for a brief interval, and (4) then dies. If, however,
a quickened foetus is killed in the womb and then stillborn, the offense was "a great
misprision." American courts usually convert Coke's "misprision" into "misde-
meanor" in articulating the degree of the offense of abortion after quickening....
As Coke's language indicates, and as decisions afterwards made clear, an abortion
before quickening, with the woman's consent, whether killing the foetus while still
within the womb, or causing its death after birth alive was not, at common law, an
indictable offense, either in her or in the abortionist. It was not a crime at all. Such
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English abortion law changed substantially with passage of Lord
Ellenborough's Act in 1803.33 The Act criminalized both pre- and
post-quickening abortions and has been described as follows:
This Act largely abolished the common law rule, but it retained a distinc-
tion between the quickened and the unquickened child in determining the
severity of the punishment. The law condemned the willful, malicious, and
unlawful use of any medical substance with the intent to induce an abor-
tion, without regard to whether the attempt was successful, or whether the
mother died as a result. Parliament recognized a justifiable interest in pro-
tecting the life of the unborn child; and the statute made abortion ("will-
fully and maliciously") a felony in every case, but punishable by death only
if the medical substance was administered after quickening.3
Thus, it became a crime to abort a fetus at any time during gesta-
tion. The level of punishment increased at quickening, but the na-
ture of the wrong was the same from conception onward.
Early American abortion decisions followed the English law with
its emphasis on quickening. 5 Beginning in Connecticut in 1821,36
however, legislatures and courts37 undertook the process of greater
criminalization of abortion, and by 1967 "every state and the Dis-
trict of Columbia had a statute making abortion a crime unless it
was necessary to save the life of the mother."' The cut-off point at
quickening was abandoned. During the 1960's, the pendulum be-
gan to swing toward more liberal abortion laws, 9 and with its 1973
decision in Roe v. Wade40 the Supreme Court established a consti-
tutional basis for the right to abortion. While the Court did not
utilize the concept of quickening to determine the point at which
an abortion after quickening, on the other hand, was a misprision or misdemeanor on
the part of the abortionist, and perhaps of the woman as well, whether she consented
or not, if foetal death occurred in utero; if the injured baby died after live birth, it
was murder.
Id. See also Lenow, supra note 5, at 4-5; Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 267-70; Note,
supra note 5, at 362-69.
33. 43 GEo. III, Ch. 58 (1803).
34. Note, supra note 5, at 363.
35. Id. See Means, supra note 28, at 426-28.
36. Note, supra note 5, at 364.
37. Means, supra note 28, at 426-27.
38. Note, supra note 5, at 365. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 at 426 Comment. See
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139 (1973) ("By the end of the 1950's, a large majority of
the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or
preserve the life of the mother.").
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139-40, 154-55 (1973). The liberalization was supported
by the Model Penal Code provisions on abortion. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 and Comment
(1980).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the state could prohibit abortion, it employed the somewhat re-
lated concept of viability.41 Thus, in a way, the law has come full
circle, with early abortion screened from criminalization, and late
term abortion a crime.
Turning from the issue of abortion to that of criminal law, we
find the common law rule that "there [was] no homicide of any
grade unless the deceased had been born alive." '42 This rule has
been retained by most states and adopted by the Model Penal
Code, which defines "homicide" as "causing the death of another
human being, '4 8 and defines "human being" as "a person who has
been born and is alive."44 While the Model Penal Code approach
41. Viability is defined as "[c]apability of living; the state of being viable; usually con-
notes a fetus that has reached 500 g in weight and 20 gestational weeks." STEDMAN'S MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY FITH UNABRIDGED LAWYERs' EDITION 1556 (1982). The concept of viability
plays an important role in the law of unborn. See infra text accompanying notes 357-61. See
also Morrison, supra note 10, at 141-44; Robertson, supra note 10, at 1414-20. "The period
of viability varies with each pregnancy and the determination of whether a particular fetus
is viable is a matter of judgment by the attending physician." HANDLING PREGNANCY &
BIRTH CASES, supra note 16, at 276. See generally id. at 275-78; Glantz, The Legal Aspects
of Fetal Viability in GENrIcs AND THE LAw 29 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976); Lenow,
supra note 5, at 10-15.
42. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 30, at 50 (footnote omitted).
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1980).
44. Id. § 210.0(1). Comment 4. (c) to Section 210.1 of the Code addressed the issue of
killing of unborn children:
Section 210.0(1) defines the term "human being" to mean a person "who has been
born and is alive." The effect of this language is to continue the common-law rule
limiting criminal homicide to the killing of one who has been born alive. Several mod-
ern statutes follow the Model Code in making this limitation explicit. Others are si-
lent on the point, but absent express statement to the contrary, they too may be
expected to carry forward the common-law approach.
The significance of the definition of "human being" is that it excludes from crimi-
nal homicide the killing of a fetus. This exclusion is warranted in order to avoid en-
tanglement of abortion in the law of homicide. Section 230.3 of the Model Code deals
with abortion as a separate offense. Although that provision is more permissive than
most prior legislation, its precise terms have been superseded by subsequent constitu-
tional developments. Specifically, the Supreme Court has declared that a woman act-
ing in consultation with her physician has a constitutional right to abort her fetus
during the first trimester of pregnancy. During the last phase of pregnancy, on the
other hand, a state may regulate or proscribe abortion except where it is necessary to
the mother's health.
Although there may remain a role for the penal law in the field of abortion, there is
at least a continuing necessity to avoid enmeshing this quite distinct problem in the
law of homicide. Failure to do so would invite at least two kinds of difficulties. First,
application of the law of homicide to abortion of a viable fetus would run the risk of
overriding legislative acceptance of certain justifications for abortion that are inappli-
cable to homicide. Criminal homicide, for example, recognizes no general exception
for killing a person with genetic defects. Yet a state might well choose to permit
abortion at any stage of pregnancy if there is medical evidence that the child would
be born severely handicapped. The second danger concerns grading. Even where a
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predominates, it is not unanimously endorsed. California, for ex-
ample, has a statute which defines murder as "the unlawful killing
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. '45 Opin-
ions differ widely on whether killing an infant in ventre sa mere
should be criminalized. The ultimate resolution of the issue is
undecided.
The law of tort and crimes protect unborn children later born
alive. 46 This similarity of focus is supported by sound policy. The
fact that an injury producing act occurs before birth does not
lessen the pain and suffering of the later born victim. 47 If anything,
the wrong is greater in the case of prenatal injury, for the victim
must bear the scars of another's wrongful act for a longer time
than one injured later in life. The interests of society are served by
deterring such acts whenever they occur. Recognition of the fetus
as a person entitled to the protection of the criminal and civil law
fosters these interests.
state decides to continue criminal penalties for certain abortions, it is highly doubtful
that the offense merits sanctions of the magnitude of those applicable to intentional
homicide. Thus, defining "human being" to exclude a fetus serves the valuable func-
tion of maintaining abortion as an area of distinct criminological concern not covered
by the law of homicide.
In one context only is this judgment open to serious challenge. Abortion is accom-
plished with the woman's consent. Whatever one's evaluation of that practice, it
seems useful to distinguish abortion from the intentional killing of a fetus without
the mother's consent. As a matter of policy, it may be thought appropriate to punish
such conduct as murder. The issue was raised in Keeler v. Superior Court, where an
estranged husband announced his intention to kill his wife's boy and kicked her in
the abdomen. As a consequence of that assault, the child was delivered stillborn. The
Supreme Court of California adhered to the common-law definition of "human being"
and refused to allow prosecution for murder. The legislature disagreed and subse-
quently amended the statute to define murder as "the unlawful killing of a human
being, or a fetus... ." The legislature was careful, as it should have been, to inte-
grate this provision with the existing California abortion law by precluding applica-
tion of the homicide statute in cases where abortion was legally authorized, in certain
cases where death of a fetus was caused by a licensed physician, and in cases where
the mother consented.
Id. (footnote omitted).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (1984 cum. pocket part). See Keeler v. Superior Court, 2
Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970) (decided prior to statutory amendment
including unborn within homicide statute); People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 830, 835 (1977) ("Section 187 gives all persons of common intelligence ample warning
that an assault on a pregnant woman without her consent for the purpose of killing her
unborn child can constitute the crime of murder."); People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751,
129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976) (interpreting § 187(a) to apply only to viable fetuses).
46. See Morrison, supra note 10, at 144-52.
47. Id. at 147-48.
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D. Guardianship of the Unborn
Blackstone wrote that under the common law "[a]n infant in
ventre sa mere .. .may have a guardian assigned to it .... 2 8
The same rule applied in America during the nineteenth century.49
For example, as an adjunct to his paternal authority, a father could
petition the court to appoint a testamentary guardian for his un-
born child. 0 The authority of courts to appoint representatives to
protect fetal interests is now firmly established. Courts of general
equitable jurisdiction are imbued with ample power to appoint
guardians and guardians ad litem for unborn children in a variety
of circumstances. 1
E. Summary
The legal system extends protection and rights to persons. The
substantive areas discussed above recognize a limited legal per-
sonhood in the unborn child. The public policy considerations
which accord such personhood and protection to the unborn
should extend as well to protection from serious abuse or neglect.
The difficult question is not whether the unborn deserve protection
from abuse and neglect, but rather, how the shield of the law
should be employed.2
III. THE UNBORN CHILD AS A "PERSON" ENTITLED TO LEGAL
PROTECTION
The preceding discussion touched on whether the fetus is a per-
son entitled to legal protection. Considerable confusion surrounds
the issue. Apart from the law, the answer depends on who is asked.
To the surgeon performing intrauterine surgery, both mother and
fetus are patients.53 Philosophers do not agree on a definition of
48. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
49. See G. FIELD, THE LEGAL RELATION OF INFANTS, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND
WARD § 59, at 63 (1888).
50. R. TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY 249 (1868).
51. See HANDLING PREGNANCY & BIRTH CASES, supra note 16, at 367-68; Note, supra
note 5, at 360-62. See also Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 395-96 (Mass. 1983) (guardian ad
litem appointed for unborn child).
52. See Baron, The Concept of Person in the Law in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE 122 (M.
Shaw & A. Doudera eds. 1983). See infra note 57.
53. See generally Barclay, McCormick, Sidbury, Michejda & Hodgen, The Ethics of
In Utero Surgery, 246 J. A.M.A. 1550 (1981); Clewell, Johnson, Meier, Newkirk, Zide,
Hendee, Bowes, Hect, O'Keefe, Henry, & Shikes, A Surgical Approach to the Treatment of
Fetal Hydrocephalus, 306 N. ENGLAND J. MED. 1320 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Clewell];
Gilmore, Is the Fetus a Patient?, 128 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N. J. 1472 (1983) (answering
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personhood. Professor Wikler, writing tongue-in-cheek, states that
"[s]ome view all products of conception as persons; others deny
this status to fetuses but extend it to some animals. One philoso-
pher has denied that there are any persons at all."'5 4 Theologians
are similarly diverse in their conclusions. For their part, judges de-
cline to grapple with the philosophical and religious aspects of per-
sonhood. Over the years they have ascribed limited legal per-
sonhood to the unborn. On the other hand, in one area of law,
judges hold that the fetus is not a person. In Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court stated "that the word 'person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."55 This state-
ment must be placed in context, however, because its seeming clar-
ity has caused serious confusion. The statement is narrow. It
pertains only to the word "person" as it appears in the fourteenth
amendment. It does not imply that the unborn are non-persons in
other legal contexts. For example, Roe does nothing to weaken the
large body of existing law protecting the unborn, and denial of
fourteenth amendment personhood does not deprive the states of
power to grant legal recognition to the unborn in non-fourteenth
amendment situations. Unfortunately, Roe is sometimes misunder-
stood as an all-pervasive statement of "non-personhood" of the un-
born. This misunderstanding leads some to conclude that states
are powerless to protect the fetus. When properly understood, the
case does not impede such efforts. The correct interpretation of
Roe is summarized by Parness and Pritchard:
By holding that a fetus is not a person under the fourteenth amendment,
the Supreme Court did not prohibit lawmakers from extending to the un-
born the benefits of personhood in other cases. In fact, the Court noted that
the state has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life." The failure to understand the Roe decision has led
not only to courts mistakenly denying the unborn non-fourteenth amend-
ment protections to which the unborn are entitled, but also to the public
failing to comprehend the discretion remaining to American lawmakers in
characterizing personhood."
"yes"); Lenow, supra note 5, at 15-19.
54. Wilder, Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective in DEFINING HuMAN
LIFE 12 (M. Shaw & A. Doudera eds. 1983). See Roth, Personhood, Property Rights, and
the Permissibility of Abortion, 2 L. & PHILOSOPHY 163 (1983); Milby, The New Biology and
the Question of Personhood: Implications for Abortion, 9 Am. J.L. & MED. 31 (1983);
Slovanko, When Does Life Really Begin? 2 MaD. & L. 81 (1983).
55. 410 U.S. at 158.
56. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 258 (footnote omitted). See Note, The Fetus
Under Section 1983: Still Struggling for Recognition, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029 (1983);
Note, Fetal Rights: Defining "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 347
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State action to protect the unborn from abuse and neglect does
not run afoul of Roe. The unborn have long enjoyed limited recog-
nition as persons, and the trend is toward greater acknowledgment;
therefore, protection from prenatal abuse and neglect should not
be viewed as novel or precedent-challenging. On the contrary, it is
entirely consistent with the movement in the law. For example, the
public policy supporting protection from tortious injury surely ex-
tends as well to protection from abusive injury. If anything, policy
considerations favoring the latter are more compelling due to the
reprehensible character of intentional abuse.
57
(1983); Comment, The Legality of Fetal Protection Policies Under Title VII: Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1131 (1983).
57. In an excellent article titled The Concept of Person in the Law, Professor Charles
H. Baron describes how the law has granted limited personhood to the fetus. He writes that
[w]hen we move to the issue of the status of the unborn, we find the law generally
evidencing ... flexibility and pragmatism in ascribing personhood. For some pur-
poses, the fetus is a person. For some, it is not. The stage at which it is granted
personhood varies from one area of the law to another. Thus, the common law of
crimes did not recognize the killing of an unborn child as homicide, and the rule in
the majority of American jurisdictions continues to be "that there is no homicide of
any grade unless the deceased had been born alive." Inducing an abortion was, at
common law, a separate crime of only misdemeanor status. It could be committed
only upon a fetus which was "quick," that is, one that had already displayed indepen-
dent movement within the mother-a phenomenon which generally begins some-
where between the sixteenth and eighteenth week of pregnancy. At the opposite ex-
treme is the treatment accorded the fetus by the law of property. For purposes of the
law of inheritance of real property, a child has been considered to be a person eligible
to inherit at the moment he or she is conceived, although this property interest has
been held subject to defeasance if the child has not subsequently been born alive.
How can this apparent inconsistency in the law be justified? The justification is a
function of the different social policies being advanced by different areas of the law.
Prime among the goals of the laws of inheritance is fulfillment of the presumed inten-
tions of the testator. Thus, where a will or the laws of inheritance specify that prop-
erty shall be inherited by one's child or children, it is presumed that the deceased
would have wanted any of his children born subsequent to his death to inherit, even
if he did not know of the child's impending existence at the time that he died. In
order to assure this consequence, the law confers on the child at the time of concep-
tion a type of personhood in which the inheritance can vest if the parent dies prior to
birth. On the other hand, the criminal law has different goals. Basic to these is pre-
serving the public peace by publicly punishing those who threaten that peace with
acts that society considers to be blameworthy. Clearly, treatment afforded the unborn
by the common law of crimes reflects a judgment that the society of the time consid-
ered the killing of a fetus to be less blameworthy than the killing of a man, and the
killing of a fetus that had not yet displayed a separate personality within the mother
to be less blameworthy than the killing of one which had.
Baron, supra note 52, at 128 (footnote omitted). Professor Baron writes that the movement
in tort law toward acceptance of recovery for fetal injury illustrates the pragmatic and pol-
icy-based approach of the legal system. Id. at 129-30. He continues by remarking "that the
law has been largely willing to confer personhood upon the unborn when solid policy consid-
erations have suggested that course." Id. at 130.
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The foregoing sections reveal that the unborn child has a long if
chequered history of recognition as a person entitled to legal pro-
tection. The focus of the following section shifts to a discussion of
the state's interest in the prenatal person.
IV. STATE INTERESTS IN THE UNBORN
The state has legitimate interests in children, and while "the
child is not the mere creature of the State," 58 there are circum-
stances where governmental intervention on their behalf is appro-
priate. Three substantial state interests in the unborn child are
discussed in this section.
A. State Interest in Protecting Potential Life
In Roe v. Wade the Court balanced the woman's privacy right to
abort her pregnancy against three state interests: safeguarding ma-
ternal health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting po-
tential life."9 Roe held that the state has an "important and legiti-
mate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." 60 The
interest exists throughout pregnancy, grows "in substantiality as
the woman approaches term,"61 and becomes compelling at the
point of viability.6' Following viability, the interest in potential life
is of sufficient strength that the state "may go so far as to pro-
Professor Baron's insight into the reasons for legal protection of the unborn apply with
great force to the argument that the fetus should be deemed a person entitled to protection
from abuse and neglect. Public policy is unequivocally opposed to child abuse and neglect.
Strong policy reasons exist for preventing acts which will cause children to be born with
serious, permanent disabilities. Granting personhood status to the unborn so that the law
can protect them from abuse and neglect is consistent with legal developments in other
substantive areas of law, and with sound public policy.
See also King, The Juridicial Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the
Unborn, 77 MiCH. L. Rav. 1647, 1664-72 (1979).
58. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
59. 410 U.S. at 154, 162.
60. Id. at 162.
61. Id. at 162-63. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 261.
62. 410 U.S. at 163-64. The Roe Court provided the following rationale for this
determination:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
"compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protec-
tive of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the
State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go as far as to pro-
scribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.
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scribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother." 3 While the fetus is not
a "person" entitled to fourteenth amendment protection, Roe
makes clear that the state has substantial authority to protect fetal
life."4
The state's interest in viable fetal life permits it to forbid abor-
tion,65 an act designed to extinguish life. It follows from this that
the state is empowered to proscribe other acts calculated or likely
to lead to the same result. Furthermore, since the interest in pres-
ervation of fetal life authorizes intervention to prevent destructive
acts, it should also authorize limited compulsion of action which is
necessary to preserve fetal life. Since a failure to act can as surely
lead to frustration of the state's interest as an affirmative act, the
underlying interest must reach both cases.66
The state interest in potential life is at its clearest in cases of
fetal death. This was the scenario the Supreme Court addressed
when it articulated the interest. It is important to point out, how-
ever, that nothing in Roe limits the state's interest to cases of fetal
death. The interest is generic, and pertains to the general well-be-
63. Id.
64. Post-Roe cases elucidate the meaning of the state interest in the potentiality of
fetal life. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court upheld a Connecticut regulation
which precluded use of Medicaid funds to pay for nontherapeutic abortions for poor women.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the "State unquestionably has a 'strong
and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth,'" Id. at 478, an interest closely
related to its "direct interest in protecting the fetus. . . ." Id. at 478 n.11. In Harris v.
McRae, 478 U.S. 297, 325 (1980), the Court upheld the so-called Hyde Amendment, which
denies federal Medicaid funding "for certain medically necessary abortions. . . ... Id. at 301.
The Court found "that the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth. . . is rationally
related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life." Id. at 325.
The "state interest in protecting the fetus" is not confined to the context of abortion. See
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975). The extent of the interest can be understood by com-
paring it to the state interest in youth, an interest extending to all aspects of protecting
children and fostering their growth and development. See infra Section IV.B. The interests
in youth and potential youth should be conterminous, so that the state may intervene in
compelling cases to protect children. An expansive interpretation of the interest in fetal life
serves the interests of society as a whole, in addition to extending protection to the com-
pletely vulnerable and helpless unborn child.
65. 410 U.S. at 163-64. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 287-88.
66. A brief author's note is appropriate at this juncture. It should be apparent that I
favor an expansive interpretation of the "state interest in protecting the fetus." Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 n.11 (1977). At the same time, the article is not intended to take
issue with the Supreme Court's abortion decisions. Nor is it about the abortion issue. Roe v.
Wade is dealt with because it has an impact on the state's authority to protect the fetus
from abuse and neglect, not because the author disagrees with the Court's analysis or
holding.
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ing of the potential child.61 Since the state may proscribe acts lead-
ing to fetal death, and may, as a result, require birth, its interest in
potential life should extend to protection of the quality of life. The
state's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life" 5 would be severely undermined if it could
require birth but do nothing to ensure that the life it saved was
worth living. 9 To this end, the state should have limited authority
to curtail acts leading to fetal injury or disfigurement that would
disable the child. Defining the state's interest in potential life in
these terms is consistent with the public policy underlying the in-
terest and society's goal of prevention of death and disability.
The state interest in fetal life is substantial and far-reaching;
however, it is difficult to define it with precision or clearly describe
its limits. The few reported cases discussing the interest indicate a
trend toward greater protection of the unborn. In Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,0 for example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court ordered a woman to submit to a blood
transfusion required to save the life of her viable fetus. The woman
did not seek the death of her unborn child. Rather, her religious
beliefs precluded the use of blood. The court stated, that "[wie are
satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection.
'7 1
The "protection" afforded was based on the state's interest in
preservation of fetal life. In a later case, Jefferson v. Griffin Spald-
ing County Hospital Authority7 2 the Georgia Supreme Court up-
held a trial court's order that a woman nine months pregnant sub-
mit to delivery by cesarean section to save the life of her child. The
woman wanted the child, but refused surgery on religious grounds.
Quoting the lower court with approval, the supreme court held
that "the State has an interest in the life of this unborn, living
67. See supra note 64.
68. 410 U.S. at 162.
69. See infra note 323.
70. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
71. Id. at 538. The court's order did not have to be carried out since the pregnant
woman left the hospital against medical advice. It is interesting to note that the few cases
dealing with court ordered medical care of unborn children have been brief in length and
analysis. The Raleigh Fithin and Jefferson cases are per curiam opinions. The Taft case
contains an interesting and useful-although brief-analysis. The courts have yet to grapple
with the issues in all their depth and complexity.
72. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). The Jefferson case generated substantial com-
mentary. See, e.g., Lenow, supra note 5, at 21-22; Note, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hospital Authority: Court-Ordered Surgery to Protect the Life of an Unborn
Child, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 83 (1983). See also Comment, The Fetal Patient and the Unwill-
ing Mother: A Standard for Judicial Intervention, 14 PAc. L.J. 1065 (1983).
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human being."'73 The "interest" was strong enough to support in-
voluntary surgical care. Unfortunately, the court declined to offer
an in-depth analysis of the "interest." In a third case, Taft v.
Taft, 7 4 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the
question of involuntary medical care required to preserve fetal life.
Mr. Taft sued his wife, seeking an order that she undergo an oper-
ation to "hold her pregnancy. 7' The lower court issued the order
over the woman's religious objection.7 6 The Supreme Judicial
Court vacated the order because the record did "not show circum-
stances so compelling as to justify curtailing the wife's constitu-
tional rights."' 77 Significantly, however, the court left open the pos-
sibility for state intervention in future cases:
We do not decide whether, in some situations, there would be justification
for ordering a wife to submit to medical treatment in order to assist in car-
rying a child to term. Perhaps the State's interest, in some circumstances,
might be sufficiently compelling ... to justify such a restriction on a per-
son's constitutional right of privacy.
7 8
These cases, which elevate the state interest in potential life over
the mother's fundamental rights, emphasize the slowly emerging
trend toward greater state protection of fetal life in contexts other
than abortion.79 Though the outer limits of the state's interest re-
main ill-defined, the underlying policies point toward expanded
protection of fetal life.
B. The General State Interest in Youth
In a 1978 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed a lower court order requiring the parents of a young leu-
kemia victim to continue a protracted course of chemotherapy.80
The court supported its holding with the observation that "the
73. 247 Ga. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
74. 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983).
75. Id. The woman had given birth to four children. Three "children were born after
the wife had an operation, known as a 'purse string' operation, which involved suturing so
that 'the cervix [would] hold the pregnancy.'" Id. at 396. One child was born premature
because the operation was not performed. The child died.
76. The woman was a "born again Christian." She believed "'that Jesus Christ will
help her and is confident and convinced that no harm will come to her baby. She is sincere
in her beliefs.'" 446 N.E.2d at 396 (quoting the trial court opinion).
77. Id. at 397 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 397.
79. See Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961) (juvenile court
had jurisdiction over unborn child to order mother to submit child to blood transfusions
immediately after birth).
80. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
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State has a long-standing interest in protecting the welfare of chil-
dren living within its borders." 81 It drew this principle from Prince
v. Massachusetts," where the supreme court described "the inter-
ests of society to protect the welfare of children." 83 In sweeping
language, the Prince court wrote that "the state's assertion of au-
thority to that end . . . is no mere corporate concern of official
authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole com-
munity, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent. . . citizens. '84
The state interest in protection of children should embrace the un-
born. Extending the interest into the womb will foster enhanced
protection for all children, and will permit this important interest
to work in tandem with the interest in potential human life.
C. State Interest in Preservation of Life
The state has an interest in preserving life. 0 The importance of
the interest was underscored by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
its landmark decision in In re Quinlan, 6 in which it was stated
that "the interest of the state in the preservation of life. . . has an
undoubted constitutional foundation. ' 87 In the context of the un-
born, this interest is closely analogous to the interest in the "po-
tentiality of human life. ' ' " Both are concerned with continuation
of life and state action to prevent its termination. Their cumula-
tive effect strengthens the case for intervention to prevent fetal
abuse and neglect.
V. SOURCES OF STATE AUTHORITY TO PROTECT CHILDREN
State interests in children are not self-executing. To assert its
interests, the state draws upon the parens patriae authority and
the police power.
81. Id. at 754, 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id.
85. See Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 262, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456
(1979); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (1977).
86. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 651-52, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
87. Id. at 19, 355 A.2d at 651-52 (footnote omitted).
88. 410 U.S. at 162.
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A. Parens Patriae
"The parens patriae power . . . is the state's limited paternalis-
tic power to protect or promote the welfare of certain individuals,
like young children . . who lack the capacity to act in their own
best interests."89 The doctrine has ancient roots, traceable to Ro-
man law.90 In England, it developed gradually, expanding from an
initial focus on preservation of property rights to a broad-based
source of governmental authority and responsibility to care for
those unable to care for themselves.9 1 According to Blackstone, the
Crown became "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and
lunatics.
'9 2
In America, "the 'parens patriae' function of the king passed to
the States."93 It has been "defined in this country as the inherent
power and authority of a Legislature of a state to provide protec-
tion of the persons and property of persons non sui juris."' The
authority was given an expansive interpretation in the 1890 Su-
preme Court case of Mormon Church v. United States,95 where the
Court stated that
[t]his prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
89. Development in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1156, 1199 (1980). See Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections on and
Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 498-501 (1982); Myers, In-
voluntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L.
REv. 368 (1984); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1207-21 (1974).
90. Myers, supra note 89, at 380-81.
91. Id. at 383-87. For analysis of the historical development of the parens patriae
power see Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22
S.C.L. REv. 147 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenile Court, 23
S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971).
92. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41.
93. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). See 67A C.J.S. Parens Pa-
triae § 159:
The words "parens patriae," meaning "father of his country," were applied origi-
nally to the king. Since, on this country's achieving its independence, the prerogatives
of the crown devolved on the people of the states, the state, as a sovereign, is the
parens patriae.
The doctrine of parens patriae expresses the inherent power and authority of the
state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris, and
under the doctrine the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons of
disability, and in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is possessed of inherent
power to provide protection to persons non sui juris and to make and enforce such
rules and regulations as it deems proper for the management of their property.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Myers, supra note 89, at 384.
94. McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1, 12, 205 P.2d 917, 925 (1922).
95. 136 U.S. 1, (1890).
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every State. . . .[I]t is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
those who cannot protect themselves."
Pursuant to parens patriae authority, states enact statutes gov-
erning guardianship, civil commitment of the mentally ill, juvenile
courts, and child abuse and neglect.
There is no doubt that parens patriae authority extends to pro-
tection of children.9 7 The Supreme Court stated in Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts that
[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attend-
ance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways
.... [T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom
and authority in things affecting the child's welfare."
When adults threaten "harm to the physical or mental health of
the child,"9 9 the state may step in. What is more, it has been
stated that in addition to the authority to act, the parens patriae
power imposes a positive duty to do so.100 As stated in a California
case, "[u]nder the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has a right,
indeed, a duty, to protect children."' 01 This broad source of gov-
ernmental authority gives the state ample power to prevent child
abuse and neglect. The authority extends to unborn children in
whose welfare the state has a compelling interest.
96. Id. at 57. See also Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 64 (Cal. Ct. App.
1947), rev'd, 192 P.2d 949 (1948). Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits
of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. Rav. 215, 221 (1975) ("the individual's well-being is the sole
justification for the exercise of the state's authority as parens patriae."); La Fond, An Ex-
amination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BuPALo L. REv. 499, 504-
06 (1981).
97. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475, 181 A.2d 751, 758 (1962) (acting as
parens patriae, the state has a "right and duty to care for a child and protect him from
neglect, abuse and fraud during his minority.").
98. 321 U.S. at 166-67. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
99. On the authority of the state to protect children, see generally Roe v. Conn, 417
F. Supp. 769, 778 (M.D. Ala. 1976); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962); Fawkes v. Fawkes,
360 So.2d 719, 720 (Ala. Ct. App. 1970); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1952); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 678-79, 126 P.2d 765, 777 (1942). For a discus-
sion of In re Hudson, see infra text accompanying notes 159-67.
100. In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("The rationale of
parens patriae is that the State must intervene in order to protect an individual who is not
able to make decisions in his own interest.").
101. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979). For a discussion
of the Phillip B. case, see infra text accompanying notes 213-33.
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B. Police Power
The police power is the state's broad authority "both to prevent
its citizens from harming one another and to promote all aspects of
the public welfare." 102 Through this power the state may foster the
"public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." s Laws prohib-
iting abuse and neglect of children are based on this expansive au-
thority as well as the parens patriae power. When these sources of
sovereign authority combine, they form a formidable defense for
children.
VI. STATE STATUTES ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
A. State Statutes on Abuse and Neglect
Every state has statutes prohibiting child abuse and neglect. ' " It
is surprising to learn that these laws are of relatively recent origin.
It was not until 1875 that the first formal organization came into
existence to address issues of abuse.10 5 From that time until 1962,
progress was halting and irregular. Finally, in 1962, C. Henry
Kempe, M.D. and his colleagues published their seminal article
describing the battered child syndrome.'0 6 With its publication, a
movement toward statutory prohibition of abuse exploded across
the United States.1
0 7
Definitions of child abuse vary from state to state; 08 however,
102. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HA~v. L. REv.
1156, 1198-99 (1980).
103. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See Cusack Co.
v. City of Chicago, 244 U.S. 526, 530 (1917); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30
(1905).
104. For a listing of the statutes see S. KATZ, M. McGRATH & R. HOWE, CHmD NEG-
LEcT LAWS IN AMERICA (1976).
105. III CHILDREN & YOUTH IN AMERICA, 1933-1973, pts. 1-4, 849 (R. Bremner ed.
1974). See id. at 849-89 for an overview discussion of child abuse in America. See also
Radbill, Children in a World of Violence: A History of Child Abuse in THE BATERED CHILD
SYNDROME 3, 16 (C. Kempe & R. Helfer eds. 1980).
106. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syn-
drome, 181 J. A.M.A. 17 (1962).
107. See generally M. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF CHILDREN 104-46 (1983);
CHILD ABUSE passim (G. Gerbner, C. Ross & E. Zigler eds. 1980); THE BATTERED CHILD (C.
Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1980); CHILD ABUSE (K. Oates ed. 1982); CHILD ABUSE: AN ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (D. Wells ed. 1980).
108. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-1 (1983 Cum. Supp.) (harm or threatened harm,
whether physical or mental, to a child's health or welfare); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West
1984) (nonaccidental injury; unjust punishment); MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 722.622 (West
1983-84) (harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare through nonaccidental
means by person responsible for health and welfare).
Vol. 23:1
Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn
most are framed in terms of nonaccidental physical or mental in-
jury or sexual abuse. Standards promulgated by the Institute of
Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association (IJA/
ABA) are illustrative.109 They authorize state intervention when "a
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that a child will
imminently suffer, a physical harm, inflicted nonaccidently ...
which causes, or creates a substantial risk of causing disfigurement,
impairment of bodily function, or other serious physical injury.""10
Intervention is also sanctioned to prevent serious emotional dam-
age " ' and sexual abuse.
1 2
Definitions of neglect often overlap abuse; however, neglect is a
broader concept, covering intentional and unintentional situations
harmful to the child."13 Failure to provide necessary medical care
can constitute neglect. Rhode Island, for example, defines a ne-
glected child as "a child whose physical or mental health or welfare
is harmed or threatened with harm when his parent. . . [flails to
109. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AMEmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
110. Id. at 16, Standard 2.1 A. The ABA STANDARDS restrict the scope of state inter-
ventioh into the family. The goals of the Standards are:
to allow intervention only where there is reason to believe that coercive intervention
will in fact benefit the child, given the knowledge available about children's needs
and the means of helping children, and taking into consideration the resources likely
to be available to help children; to insure that when intervention occurs, every effort
is made to keep children with their parents, or if this is impossible, to provide them
with a stable living situation conducive to their well-being; to insure that procedures
are followed which facilitate making appropriate decisions; and to insure that all deci-
sionmakers are held accountable for their actions.
Id. at 3. For authorities favoring limited state intervention on behalf of children, see J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF no CHILD (1973); Gold-
stein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy,
86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected Children": A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 985 (1975) (Professor Wald is one of the
Commissioners responsible for drafting the ABA STANDARDS) [hereinafter cited as Wald];
Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. Rav.
1383 (1974).
111. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 109, at 16, Standard 2.1 C.
112. Id. at 2.1 D.
113. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 232.2 (1983) (neglect includes abandonment, failure to pro-
vide proper care, and injurious living conditions); MNN. STAT. § 260.015 (1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-517 (1982). Professor Wald observes that:
State statutes establishing juvenile court jurisdiction often make separate reference
to dependency, neglect, and abuse. In "dependency" cases, a parent, through no fault
of his own, is unable to care for a child. "Neglect" and "abuse" generally both involve
"fault" on the part of the parents; "abuse" usually refers to willful injuries to the
child, while "neglect" refers to inadequate parental care.
Wald, supra note 110, at 985 n.5.
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supply . . .medical care."1" The IJA/ABA Standards are to the
same effect, permitting intervention when "a child is in need of
medical treatment ... and his/her parents are unwilling to pro-
vide or consent"11 to care.
There is a lively debate regarding the appropriate reach of state
power to intervene in family privacy to stop abuse and neglect;" 6
however, no one argues for complete abolition of such authority.
Properly circumscribed with substantive and procedural safe-
guards, limited state authority is necessary and appropriate.
B. State Child Abuse and Neglect Laws Apply to the Unborn
Several cases discuss whether child abuse and neglect statutes
extend to the unborn. Though the cases reach differing results,
policy considerations support the argument for such extension.
1. Cases Interpreting Abuse and Neglect Statutes
Abuse and neglect statutes are drafted to include children under
a certain age, usually eighteen.' 17 The only limitation expressed in
the statutes is at the upper end of the age range. Nothing limits
them to children who have been born, and nothing in their nature
precludes a construction including the unborn. It must be admit-
ted, however, that legislators probably were not thinking of unborn
children when they passed such statutes. With this in mind, more
than one court has concluded that the unborn are not protected.118
For example, in Matter of Dittrick Infant,119 the Michigan Court
114. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(2)(d)(1983 Supp.).
115. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 109, at 17, Standard 2.1 E. The Standards allow
court intervention when:
a child is in need of medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent him/her from
suffering serious physical harm which may result in death, disfigurement, or substan-
tial impairment of bodily functions, and his/her parents are unwilling to provide or
consent to the medical treatment.
Id.
116. Compare Goldstein, supra note 110, Wald, supra note 110, and Uviller, Save
Them from Their Saviors: The Constitutional Rights of the Family in CHILD ABUSE 147 (G.
Gerbner, C. Ross & E. Zigler eds. 1980) with S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAL (1971) and the
dissenting views of Commissioner Justine Wise Polier in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 109,
at 200-02.
117. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3003(1964). See N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4C-
11 (West 1981). This section expressly includes unborn children. See also M. PAULSEN & C.
WHrrEBREAD, JuvEmnE LAW AND PROCEDURE 40-43 (1978).
118. Matter of Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 527-28 (1981). See
also Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977) (fetus not
within protection of child endangering statute).
119. 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977).
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of Appeals held that the state juvenile code did not apply to the
unborn.120 The parental rights of the Dittricks were terminated in
1976 for physical and sexual abuse.121 While the 1976 case was
pending, the mother became pregnant a second time. Prior to birth
of the second child, the probate court, acting pursuant to the juve-
nile statutes, "issued an order directing the. . .Department of So-
cial Services [to] take temporary custody of the [unborn] child.'1
22
The order issued forty-five days prior to birth. On appeal the par-
ents argued successfully that the juvenile code did not extend to
the unborn. The statute granted jurisdiction over children below
seventeen years of age. 2 8 While the court recognized "that the
word 'child' could be read as applying even to unborn persons, '"124
it concluded "that the legislature did not intend application of
these provisions to unborn children.' 2 5 The rationale for this con-
clusion was that when the statute was read in conjunction with
other provisions it seemed limited to children who had been
born. 26 The Dittrick case is unfortunate. Its holding is based on
an understandable but unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of
the statutes - an interpretation which completely ignores compel-
ling public policy reasons for extending the protection of abuse and
neglect statutes to the unborn. The court recognized the wisdom of
extending the statutes, stating that legislative amendment would
be desirable; however, it declined to take the necessary step on its
own.
1 27
Several courts, however, have recognized the applicability of ju-
venile codes to the unborn. In Hoener v. Bertinato,2' for example,
a New Jersey juvenile court judge held that parents neglected their
unborn child when they refused to give consent to a blood transfu-
120. Id. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 37.
121. Id. at 221, 263 N.W.2d at 38.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court utilized a similar analysis to support
its conclusion that the fetus is not a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973).
127. 80 Mich. App. at 211, 263 N.W.2d at 39. In states where judicial opinion has
excluded the unborn from the protection of child abuse and neglect statutes, advocates can
argue that the inherent parens patriae authority of courts of general equitable jurisdiction
is sufficient to extend the necessary protection. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying
text.
128. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
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sion that had to be administered immediately following birth.1 2 9
Like the statute interpreted in Dittrick, the New Jersey provision
granted jurisdiction over persons below a specified age;130 however,
contrary to Dittrick, the New Jersey court stated that "nothing in
any of [the statutory] provisions. . . would preclude their applica-
bility to an unborn child."'3' The court held that it had statutory
and inherent parens patriae jurisdiction over the unborn child.
The decision saved the child's life, and it stands as a well-reasoned
precedent substantiating the position that abuse and neglect stat-
utes can and should be interpreted to embrace the unborn. In an
unreported Colorado juvenile court case, 3 2 a pregnant woman re-
fused to undergo a cesarean section needed to save her full term
fetus. A court hearing was conducted in her hospital room. The
court held that the child was entitled to the protection of the juve-
nile code, and that the fetus was a neglected and dependent child.
It ordered the woman to undergo cesarean section. After the
court's order, the patient became more cooperative and submitted
to the procedure. 33 In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospi-
tal Authority"'" the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a juvenile
court opinion that a viable fetus was "entitled to the protection of
the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia.'' 5 Finally, in Matter of Baby
X,1' 6 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that prenatal conduct
causing post partum injury could constitute child abuse within the
129. The mother and father of the unborn child were Jehovah's Witnesses. They were
"good and devoted parents, except in their refusal to consent to the transfusion." Id. at 519,
171 A.2d at 142.
130. Id. ("Children under 18 years of age who appear before the juvenile and domestic
relations court in any capacity shall be deemed to be wards of the court and protected
accordingly.").
131. Id. at 144.
132. See Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Per-
spectives, 58 OBsTrmcs & GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981). See also Annas, Forced Cesareans: The
Most Unkindest Cut of All, 12 THE HASTINGS CENTE REPORT 16 (June, 1982); Lieberman,
Mazor, Chaim, & Cohen, The Fetal Right to Live, 53 OBsTLrmcs & GYNECOLOGY 515 (1979).
133. Information concerning this case may be obtained by writing to Dr. Donald C.
Bross, Legal Counsel, C. Henry Kempe National Center for Prevention and Treatment of
Child Abuse and Neglect, 1205 Oneida St., Denver, Colorado 80330.
134. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). See Comment, Family Law-Court-Ordered
Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fetus-Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospi-
tal Authority, 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981), 5 W. NEw ENGLAND L. Rav. 125, 139-41
(1982); Note, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority: Court-Ordered Sur-
gery to Protect the Life of an Unborn Child, 9 AM. J.L. & MaD. 84 (1983).
135. 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459. For a discussion of the Jefferson case, see infra
text accompanying notes 389-93. See also, Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983).
136. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). See note 393, infra.
Vol. 23:1
Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn
meaning of the juvenile code.1 87
The foregoing cases constitute persuasive authority for extension
of abuse and neglect statutes to the unborn.13 8 While legislative
amendment is desirable to remove uncertainty, it is not necessary
for attainment of the desired goal. Furthermore, the aim is sup-
ported by strong considerations of public policy.
2. State Interests in the Unborn Support Statutory Construc-
tion to Extend Coverage
The important state interests in preservation of life, the potenti-
ality of life, and child welfare lend resolute support to the argu-
ment that child abuse and neglect statutes should include unborn
children. In reality, this is the only way to give meaningful effect to
those interests. An interest stripped of a method of enforcement is
a feckless thing. Nowhere in law are significant state interests un-
accompanied by a means of implementation. This is certainly true
where the state seeks to prevent death or serious bodily injury.
The only reasonable mechanism to implement state interests in
the unborn is through existing abuse and neglect statutes.3 9 Since
these statutes can be construed to include the unborn, protection
of legitimate state interests calls for such an interpretation. The
law should follow the course charted by Bertinato. Doing so will
nourish important state interests, and extend long overdue legal
protection to the unborn.
137. 97 Mich. App. at 115-16, 293 N.W.2d at 739. See Baby Boy Santos, 71 Misc.2d
789, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
138. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered a preg-
nant woman to submit to a blood transfusion necessary to save her life and the life of her
fetus. The court held that "the unborn child was entitled to the law's protection." 42 N.J. at
422, 201 A.2d at 538.
139. It can be argued that adequate protection for the unborn can be achieved through
use of inherent parens patriae power, and that it is unnecessary to resort to arguably inap-
plicable juvenile court codes. While courts of general equitable jurisdiction possess sufficient
parens patriae authority to order necessary intervention, use of juvenile court statutes and
concepts--developed over years of practice-will establish workable definitions of abuse and
neglect. Furthermore, reliance on principles of juvenile court jurisprudence makes it possi-
ble to utilize standards and procedures which are tested and familiar to bench and bar.
Finally, it is submitted that public policy strongly favors judicial construction of juvenile
court statutes to include the unborn.
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3. Interpreting Child Abuse Statutes to Include the Unborn is
Consistent with Developments in Tort Law
Tort law extends substantial protection to the fetus.4 0 While
compensatory damages may be some consolation for injury or
death of an unborn child, an after-the-fact remedy pales in com-
parison to the importance of prevention of threatened harm. The
only effective means to achieve prevention is through use of abuse
and neglect laws. Such use will bring this area of child protection
into harmony with advances in tort law. The two fields should
work in tandem to safeguard children.
4. Scientific Advances in Ability to Treat the Unborn Favor Ex-
tension of Abuse and Neglect Statutes
Recent years have witnessed remarkable advances in prenatal
medicine and fetal surgery." As medical science achieves greater
140. See supra discussion at notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
141. In a leading treatise on obstetrics, Professors Pritchard and MacDonald state
that
[hiappily, we have entered an era in which the fetus can be rightfully considered and
treated as our second patient. In this edition, we have sought to do just that. Fetal
diagnosis and therapy have now emerged as legitimate tools the obstetrician must
p ... .We are of the view that it is the most exciting of times to be an obste-
trician. Who would have dreamed-even a few years ago-that we could serve the
fetus as physician?
J. PRrrcHAmm & P. MAcDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTFMCS vii (16th ed. 1980). For background
reading on medicine's ability to diagnose and treat the unborn, see generally, Bader &
Weitzman, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 60 AM. J. OPToMrrRY & PHYSIOLOGICAL OPTics 542
(1983); Barclay, supra note 53; Bowers & Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical
and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBsTrmcs & GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981); Clewell, supra note 53;
Depp, Sabbagha, Brown, Tamura & Reedy, Fetal Surgery for Hydrocephalus: Successful In
Utero Ventriculoamniotic Shunt for Dandy-Walker Syndrome, 61 OsTETRmcs & GYNECOL-
oGY 710 (1983); Gilmore, supra note 53; Finnegan, In Utero Opiate Dependence and Sud-
den Infant Death Syndrome, 6 CLINICS IN PMUNATOLOGY 163 (1979); Harris & Srinivasan,
Infants in Drug-Dependent Mothers, 18 SEMINARS IN ROENTGENOLOGY 79 (1983); Lenow,
supra note 5; Lifschitz, Wilson, O'Brian, Smith & Desomond, Fetal and Postnatal Growth
of Children Born to Narcotic-Dependent Women, 102 J. PEDIATRICS 686 (1983); Mackenzie,
Collins & Popkin, A Case of Fetal Abuse?, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 699 (1982); Redwine
& Petres, Fetal Surgery-Past, Present, and Future, 10 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 399
(1983); Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 THE HASTINGS CENTRM REPORT 10
(1982); Stanage, Gregg & Massa, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome-Intrauterine Child Abuse, 36
S.D. J. MED. 35 (1983).
The fetus who is a subject of federally funded research receives protection under federal
regulations governing research with human subjects. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201 to 46.211.
(1983).
A new procedure known as chorionic villus biopsy permits diagnois of certain fetal abnor-
malities as early as the sixth week of pregnancy. The procedure is not yet generally availa-
ble, yet is a good example of the rapidly expanding field of prenatal medicine. See Holz-
1984 Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn
ability to treat unborn children, demand for such care will grow. At
the same time, cases will occur where parents unjustifiably refuse
to consent to care. Interpreting child abuse and neglect statutes to
include the unborn will enable courts to override parental objec-
tion in appropriate cases. In an age when medicine can treat and
cure the unborn child, society will not tolerate a complete vacuum
of authority to provide care in compelling cases.14
greve, Hogge & Golbus, Chorion Villi Sampling (CVS) For Prenatal Diagnosis Of Genetic
Disorders: First Results and Future Research, 17 EURoPEAN J. OBsriiucs & GYNECOLOGY &
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 121 (1984).
142. See Lipson, Contamination of the Foetal Environment-A Form of Prenatal
Abuse in CHILD ABUSE 42 (K. Oates ed. 1982). Doctor Lipson describes numerous agents
which may affect the fetus, causing birth defects or fetal death. He lists: prescribed drugs,
alcohol, narcotics, smoking, infection, heat, vitamin deficiency, vitamin excess, metabolic
diseases (phenylketonuria and diabetes), and irradiation. Of particular significance because
of its high incidence rate is fetal alcohol syndrome. Doctor Lipson describes the problem:
Despite references in Greek mythology, the Bible and literature that alcohol could be
dangerous to the foetus it was only since Lemoine, from France in 1968 and Jones
and Smith from the United States in 1973 described their studies. that it has been
accepted that alcohol can have an adverse effect on the foetus. These children are
born with a variety of major and minor malformations including congenital heart dis-
ease, cleft palate, mental retardation and cerebral palsy. They are small at birth, grow
relatively poorly and have a peculiar facial appearance due to relatively small facial
bones, nose and eyes. The incidence of severely affected babies is said to be about two
per 1000 live births. The incidence of moderately or mildly affected babies is not
known. The difficulties in retrospectively ascertaining the amount of alcohol actually
consumed during a pregnancy are great particularly when intake is usually underesti-
mated and even denied. Some studies based on interviews during and after pregnancy
have indicated that three standard drinks per day constitute a significant risk to the
foetus. Acute intoxications or binges particularly early in pregnancy may be impor-
tant in outcome. Inherent differences in metabolism and tolerance despite prior expe-
rience with alcohol, could identify an at-risk group of women who are particularly
sensitive to the detrimental effects of alcohol.
Alcohol abuse is commonly associated with abuse of other drugs such as barbitu-
ates, narcotics and smoking. Although alcohol consumption by itself is associated
with the foetal alcohol syndrome the additive or potentiating effects of other drugs
may be important.
Id. at 43 (footnote omitted). See also Milunsky, Fetal Abnormalities: Detection, Counsel-
ing, and Dilemmas in DEFINING HuMAN LwE 62 (M. Shaw & A. Doudera eds. 1983).
In an informative article, Doctor Mitchell S. Golbus, M.D., describes advances in fetal
diagnosis and treatment. The following excerpt from Dr. Golbus' article should provide use-
ful background:
The medical approach to a disease or group of disorders routinely has three stages:
recognizing that the disease state exists, developing methods for diagnosing the disor-
der; and finding a prophylaxis or therapy for the condition. The recognition that
birth defects exist dates from antiquity, but advancement to the second stage, that of
considering the fetus as a patient and prenatally diagnosing congenital defects, began
only 15 years ago. The third stage, treatment of the fetus in utero, is only beginning
now.
FETOSCOPY
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VII. FAILURE To PROVIDE PRENATAL MEDICAL CARE AS CHILD
ABUSE OR NEGLECT
When parents refuse consent to medical care which is essential
As the name implies, the objective of prenatal diagnosis is to determine whether a
fetus believed to be at risk for a particular birth defect is actually affected. The most
direct method of examining the patient is to look at him or her through a small bore
fiberoptic endoscope which can be inserted transabdominally into the uterus under
local anesthesia ....
The major use of fetoscopy has been for obtaining samples of fetal tissues other
than amniotic fluid constituents .... This area of prenatal diagnosis is expected to
expand over the next decade.
FETAL THERAPY
The ultimate goal for prenatal diagnosis is treatment of the affected fetus to correct
the defect. For many disorders it is unlikely that effective corrective or preventive
therapy will be developed in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, in at least some
metabolic disorders, irreversible fetal damage may have occurred by the time the pre-
natal diagnosis is made. However, therapeutic alternatives for the management of a
number of fetal disorders which can be recognized in utero may be outlined. Since
experience with the fetus as a patient is still quite limited, such alternatives must be
considered tentative-the basis for further investigation and refinement.
Most correctable malformations which can be diagnosed in utero are best managed
by appropriate medical or surgical therapy after delivery at term. The full-term in-
fant is better able to tolerate surgery and anesthesia than is the prematurely deliv-
ered infant. Examples of abnormalities in this category include the narrowing or ab-
sence of part of the gastrointestinal tract, a small spina bifida, or a cleft palate.
Prenatal diagnosis may be important because many of these anomalies are associated
with an excess of amniotic fluid which may initiate premature labor. Therapy for the
excess amniotic fluid or premature labor may allow the fetus to remain in utero
longer and to be born at term. Additionally, the delivery can be planned so that the
necessary neonatologists, anesthesiologists and pediatric surgeons are available.
There is a subset of fetal anomalies which require correction ex utero as soon as
possible after the diagnosis is made. For these, the risk of prematurity must be
weighed against risk of continued gestation. Elective premature delivery for immedi-
ate correction may be preferable to continued gestation for such disorders as
hydrocephalus or for moderately severe Rh isoimmunization ....
Another subset of fetal disorders may influence the mode of delivery and require
that a cesarean section be performed. One indication for cesarean delivery is an
anomoly such that the fetus could not fit through the maternal pelvis during vaginal
delivery (e.g., conjoined twins or a fetus with a large hydrocephalus). Occasionally, an
elective cesarean section may be indicated for a malformation requiring immediate
surgical correction in a sterile environment ....
IN UTERO INTERVENTION
There is a subset of fetal deficiency states which may be alleviated by in utero treat-
ment. These are conditions in which something vital to fetal well-being is not present
in sufficient quantity, and supplementation of the missing element would constitute
medical therapy. The simplest method of supplying the fetus is to give the missing
element to the mother for transportation across the placenta to the fetus ....
Some substances, however, do not cross the placenta and cannot be delivered to the
fetus by the mother. In such cases, the deficient substance must be placed in the
amniotic sac where the fetus, who continually swallows the amniotic fluid, will ingest
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to prevent serious fetal injury or death, state authorities may seek
to intervene in the belief that refusal constitutes child neglect or
abuse. Such cases will arise with increasing frequency as medical
technology advances. As judges struggle with the intractable issues
presented by such cases, they may draw substantial guidance from
the well developed body of law dealing with state initiated medical
it; alternatively the fetus must be given a shot in the buttocks ....
Even more complicated is the delivery of cells, such as red blood cells, to the fetus.
In Rh isoimmunization, the maternal antibodies destroy fetal red blood cells and the
fetus may die of profound anemia. Thus, it is accepted practice to treat severe cases
by transfusing the fetus in utero. The technique is to place a needle transabdominally
into the fetal abdominal cavity and transfer the needed cells directly to the fetal
peritoneal cavity ....
The list of substances which can be given therapeutically to the in utero fetus is
certain to grow ....
SURGICAL FETAL THERAPY
The complement of medical therapy is, of course, surgical therapy. Correcting an ana-
tomic malformation will be more difficult than providing a missing substrate, hor-
mone or medication to the fetus. The prenatally diagnosable anatomic malformations
which warrant consideration for surgical therapy are those which interfere with fetal
development and which, if alleviated, would allow normal fetal development to pro-
ceed. The first malformations being considered are hydronephrosis secondary to an
obstruction, diaphragmatic hernia, and hydrocephalus.
Urinary Tract Obstruction
Obstructive fetal urinary tract malformations are being recognized with increasing
frequency because fluid-filled masses are particularly easy to detect by sonography
It has been observed that failure to take action often leads to the delivery at term
of an infant who has neither sufficient functioning kidney tissue nor lung capacity to
survive. Therefore, the philosophy has developed that it may be advisable to relieve
the obstruction at the earliest possible time. The concept is that continued obstruc-
tion will result in a kidney whose development is so impaired as to prevent survival,
while relief of the obstruction may allow sufficient development to support postnatal
life as well as "catch-up" development during early childhood.
There are several alternatives for decompressing an obstructed fetal urinary tract.
Hydrocephalus
Hydrocephalus of prenatal origin occurs in 0.2 percent of all deliveries. It represents a
failure of normal cerebrospinal fluid dynamics so that this fluid accumulates in the
ventricles, causing them to enlarge and cause pressure atrophy of the brain. Prenatal
hydrocephalus represents a subset of childhood hydrocephalus, with a significantly
poorer outlook. Between one-half and two-thirds of affected fetuses are stillborn.
Only one-quarter of liveborn hydrocephalic neonates survive infancy untreated ....
[I]t is clear that for optimal treatment of progressive prenatal hydrocephalus, in
utero drainage of the ventricles may be required. Waiting until after a term delivery
to treat may critically delay therapy. Two approaches to solving this problem have
been tried recently- one group performed six weekly needle aspirations of the dilated
ventricles of a fetus with hydrocephalus; a second group treated fetuses with prenatal
hydrocephalus by placing a polyethylene shunt that could drain ventricular cerebro-
spinal fluid into the amniotic sac ....
Golbus, Advances in Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy in DFFINING HuMAN Ln 73, 73-81 (M.
Shaw & A. Doudera eds. 1983). See also authorities cited supra note 141.
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care for children whose parents refuse consent. This section de-
scribes this important body of law.
A. Parents Have a Duty to Provide Medical Care for Their
Children
It is well settled that parents have a duty to support and main-
tain their children. In his Commentaries, Blackstone describes the
duty in terms which remain accurate:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a
principle of natural law; an obligation. . . laid on them not only by nature
herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for
they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only
gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. By be-
getting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to
endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall
be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect
right of receiving maintenance from their parents.
14 3
Even in Blackstone's time - not an age solicitous toward chil-
dren 14 4 - proper "maintenance" is referred to as a "right" of
childhood. The term includes food, clothing, shelter, and educa-
tion. Subsequent authorities add necessary medical care.14 5 In
Mitchell v. Davis,1" for example, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
stated that "[m]edicines, medical treatment and attention, are in a
like category with food, lodging and education as necessaries from
parent to child, for which the former is held legally responsible."
14 7
The Arizona Supreme Court wrote that "a parent must provide a
child [with necessaries, including] a place to live, clothing, an edu-
cation, attention, and medical care as may be required."1" When
parents fail to provide essential medical care for a child, the state
may intervene to do so. The basis for intervention is usually an
allegation of parental neglect. " 9
143. I. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *447 (emphasis in original).
144. Blackstone lived from 1723 to 1780. See generally THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD
303-75 (L. deMause ed. 1947); C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (1838); C. DICKENS, THE OLD Cumu-
osrrv SHOP (1841); C. DICKENS, NICHOLAS NIcKLEBY (1839). Charles Dickens lived from 1812
to 1870. His compelling descriptions of cruelty toward children at the hands of parents, the
state, employers, and educators capture the essence of our legacy of maltreatment. See also
G. PAYNE, THE CHILD IN HUMAN PROGRESS 312-40 (1916).
145. See Comment, Parens Patriae-A Revised Judicial Approach in Medical-Reli-
gious Conflicts in Michigan, 1981 DFT. C. L. REv. 83, 85-88 (1981).
146. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
147. Id. at 813-14.
148. Appeal in Cochise County, 133 Ariz. 157, 160, 650 P.2d 459, 462 (1982) (In Banc.).
149. Many states include failure to provide necessary medical care within the defini-
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B. State Authority to Provide Medical Care Over Parental
Objection - Historical Development
An unbroken line of authority holds that in appropriate cases
the state may intervene in the family to provide necessary medical
care over parental objection. The early decisions speak of parental
neglect of the duty to provide maintenance, including medical care.
Cases decided after enactment of juvenile codes continue to find
neglect, but do so in terms of statutory definitions.
In 1880, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Heinemann's
Appeal.150 The parent before the court refused to call a physician
when his wife and three of his children were stricken with diphthe-
ria, which led to death. Fearing for two remaining children, the
maternal grandmother sought guardianship. The court upheld the
guardianship, and remarked that the deceased children had been
"shamefully neglected as regards [their] medical treatment."151 An
English case decided in 1883 provides further insight into nine-
teenth century thought. In In re Agar-Ellis" ' the Master of the
Rolls questioned whether equity could interfere with the custody
rights of an abusive father:
I am not prepared to say that the patience of the Court, in the case of its
ward, might not be exhausted ... by cruelty to a great extent, or pitiless
spitefullness to a great extent. I am not prepared to say the Court would not
interfere in such a case, although no Court has yet decided it, but the Court
could not interfere on such grounds as that except in the utmost need and
in the most extreme case.153
Lord Justice Cotton agreed, stating he "would in no way limit the
hand of the Court or say that where there are cases of cruelty to a
child the Court would not interfere."" While intervention was un-
common during the nineteenth century, courts possessed inherent
authority to protect and provide maintenance for neglected and
abused children.
In the 1933 case In re Vasko,15 5 the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court discussed "the right of the state. . . to
tion of child neglect. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.17.070 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1983).
150. 96 Pa. 112 (1880). For discussion of the power of a court of equity to remove
custody of children from their parents, see 3 J. Pomery, Equity Jurisprudence 329-31
(1883).
151. Id. at 115.
152. 24 Law Rep. 317 (Ch. 1883).
153. Id. at 328.
154. Id. at 334.
155. 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).
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assume the discharge of duties of parents or guardians in matters
involving the life, health, and physical welfare of their children
. . . when it appears [they] have become derelict in their duty and
failed to perform it."" 6 The parents in Vasko refused to consent to
an operation needed to save their child's life. 157 Overriding their
objection, the court observed that the state's "beneficence extends
also to conservation of the health of children, their physical well-
being, as well as to the preservation of their lives. If parents or
guardians neglect their duty in respect to any one of those obliga-
tions, the state in its wisdom, through its laws, intervenes.' 5"
In 1942 the Washington Supreme Court handed down In re
Hudson." The majority opinion takes a narrow view of state au-
thority. The dissent points the way toward the contemporary judi-
cial attitude. The Hudson child suffered from a horribly deformed
and enlarged arm. "The offending arm is ten times the size of the
other arm . . . [It] is nearly as large as the body." 60 Surgeons
recommended amputation; however, the operation entailed sub-
stantial risk, and the parents refused to consent."" The majority
began by asserting that in cases of neglect, depravity, or failure to
provide essential care, courts of general equitable jurisdiction have
ample authority to protect children and, if necessary, remove them
from parental custody. 6 ' However, such intervention can only oc-
156. Id. at 553 (case decided on basis of statute).
157. The child was two. She had a malignancy in one eye which threatened to "follow
the optic nerve into the brain," causing death. Id. at 555. "The parents arbitrarily refused to
permit the operation, on the ground. . . that [they] 'would rather have the child as she is
now.' 'God gave [them] the baby and God can do what he wants."' Id.
158. Id. at 553-54.
159. 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
160. 13 Wash. 2d at 714, 126 P.2d at 784 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
161. 13 Wash. 2d at 677, 126 P.2d at 768-69.
162. Id. at 697, 126 P.2d at 775. The court discussed development of the inherent
parens patriae authority of courts of equity to remove children from unfit parents:
The justification for the power to take a child away from depraved parents derives
from the old chancery jurisdiction, exercised as parens patriae, which in former times
was invoked chiefly for children with property or in connection with matrimonial de-
crees. While this ancient chancery doctrine is today turned to wider service on behalf
of infants suffering from poverty, vice and neglect, this power is not unlimited.
"As long as parents properly exercise their duty, under their natural rights, to rear,
educate and control their children their right to do so may not be interfered with
solely because some other person or some other institution might be better deemed
for the purpose."
We agree with counsel for respondent court that the superior courts of this state
are courts of general jurisdiction and have power to hear and determine all matters
legal and equitable in all proceedings known to the common law except in so far as
those have been expressly denied; that the jurisdiction of a court of equity over the
Vol. 23:1
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cur in the presence of neglect or unfitness. 163 The majority held
that if parents are otherwise responsible and morally fit, their re-
fusal to consent to medical care cannot constitute unfitness or neg-
lect.' " In other words, a "parent who is of excellent character and
morally fit cannot be deprived of custody"1 65 even though he or she
deprives a child of essential medical care. The court's opinion re-
flects extraordinary deference to parental judgment and decision-
making, placing beyond governmental reach decisions leading to
serious harm.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Simpson pointed out the non-
sequitur underlying the majority opinion. 66 It simply does not fol-
low that refusal to provide medical care cannot constitute neglect.
Summarizing his position, he wrote that
[i]n actions relative to the custody of the child the courts do not recognize
any legal right in the parent which will militate against the best interests of
the child ....
[T]he parent-child-state legal relationship imposes certain duties on the
parent. All of these aim at one objective - the welfare of the child ....
When the right to custody conflicts with the duty to consider the child's
welfare, the latter outweighs the former .... When this duty is breached,
the state as parens patriae, has the power to invade the right of custody for
the purpose of compelling the performance of parental obligations.
[I]t is my belief that since the essence of all children's laws is to insure
the well-being of the child, any parental action which would jeopardize this
objective ... constitutes such a violation of duty as to forfeit the right of
custody.
167
persons, as well as the property, of infants has long been recognized and that the
right of the state to exercise guardianship over a child does not depend on a statute
asserting that power.
Unquestionably, if a parent by neglect shows that he or she is unwilling or unable
to provide that care to which his or her minor children are entitled, a court of equity,
in the absence of statutory authorization, may remove those children from the cus-
tody of their parent and place them in the custody of a proper person as legal guard-
ian of those children; in fact, statutory regulations as to the custody and care of in-
fants will not affect the jurisdiction of a court of equity over infants.
Id. at 702, 126 P.2d at 777 (citations omitted). While the court found inherent power to
protect children, it could find very few cases dealing with medical care over parental objec-
tion. What authority existed at that time indicated doubt whether the authority existed at
common law to require medical care. See id. at 705-06, 126 P.2d at 779-81. See also, In re
Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div.
128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).
163. See supra note 162.
164. 13 Wash. 2d at 712, 126 P.2d at 778.
165. Id. at 729, 126 P.2d at 790 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 723-24, 730, 126 P.2d at 788, 790. Justice Simpson observed that
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 23:1
While the sweep of his language is too broad, the logic of Justice
Simpson's dissent has carried the day. In the 1973 case In re
CFB,168 for example, the court stated that "the concept of 'neglect'
does cover a situation where a parent fails and refuses to offer a
child necessary medical attention." 16 9 Similarly, in Morrison v.
State1 70 the court ordered blood transfusions for a twelve day old
infant over parental objection. It noted that "[c]ourts of equity
. . . have traditionally exercised their power to safeguard and pro-
tect the personal rights of infants, 1 71 including "the child's life
and health. 17 2 In the recent leading case, Custody of a Minor, 17
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[o]n a
proper showing that parental conduct threatens a child's well-be-
ing, the interests of the State and of the individual child may man-
date intervention. '17' Finally, in the 1982 decision Appeal of
Cochise County,17 5 the Arizona Supreme Court stated that
[t]he right of parents to the custody of their children . . . is not absolute
.... The state has an interest in the welfare and health of their children
... . If the interest of the state is great enough-that is, if the welfare of
the child is seriously jeopardized-the state may act and invade the rights
of the parent and the family . . . If the parent fails to furnish [basic]
needs, the state may and should act on behalf of the child.176
The law is settled that in appropriate cases the state may inter-
[t]he right to the custody of a child is ordinarily in the parents, but it is not an
absolute or inalienable right.
The state as parens patriae has a superior right of guardianship over all minors
within its jurisdiction.
Id. at 723, 126 P.2d at 787.
168. 497 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
169. Id. at 834. (Child withdrawn from psychiatric care by parent. Held: parents not
guilty of neglect under facts of case).
170. 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
171. Id. at 102.
172. Id. at 103. The parents in Morrison took the position "that a child cannot be
'neglected' within the meaning of the statute merely because its parents fail to provide med-
ical attention." Id. at 101. This argument is similar to that espoused by the majority in In re
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). For a discussion of Hudson, see supra notes
159-67 and accompanying text. The Morrison court rejected the parents' argument, and
held that when a child's life was endangered by parental refusal to consent to medical care,
the court could declare the child dependent, and order medical care over parental objection.
See infra notes 177-96 and accompanying text.
173. 373 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
174. Id. at 749, 379 N.E.2d at 1063 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of this case,
see infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
175. 133 Ariz. 157, 650 P.2d 459 (1982) (In Banc).
176. Id. at 161, 650 P.2d at 463.
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vene to provide necessary medical care. The Arizona court accu-
rately reflected contemporary judicial thinking when it held that
intervention is permissible where parental neglect places a child in
serious jeopardy.
C. Need for Care in Life Threatening and Non-Life
Threatening Situations
It is clear that the state may exercise parens patriae authority
to require medical care for minors; however, the cases differentiate
between treatment needed to save the child's life and treatment
that is important but not essential to life.
1. Treatment Needed to Save the Child's Life
There are numerous cases ordering life-saving medical care over
parental objection. "Courts which have considered the question
.. .uniformly have decided that State intervention is appropriate
where the medical treatment sought is necessary to save the child's
life." 1 "
In Custody of a Minor,17 8 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court addressed the question of "whether the State may intervene
when parents decline to administer the only type of medical treat-
ment which ... could save their child's life. ''179 The child was suf-
fering from acute lymphocytic leukemia. His doctors prescribed a
protracted course of chemotherapy, which afforded a reasonable
possibility of cure. Termination of therapy would lead to death.
After following doctor's orders for some time, the parents stopped
giving the drugs, and the state sought to reinstate therapy. The
court began its analysis by "recognizing that there exists a 'private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.' ,18o Parental
rights are fundamental, and must be weighed carefully against
competing interests; however, "family autonomy is not absolute,
and may be limited where... 'it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of [the] child.' "181 Parental
rights "do not clothe parents with life and death authority over
their children." 82 Balanced against the parent's rights are the
177. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 747, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (1978) (footnote
omitted) (citing numerous authorities at id. 1062 n.8).
178. 375 Mass. 753, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
179. Id. at 737, 379 N.E.2d at 1056.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 748, 379 N.E.2d at 1063.
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state's interests in "protecting the welfare of children,"'' 8 preserv-
ing life,1 ' and "protecting the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession."'' 5 In the court's mind the balance tipped unequivocally in
favor of the state. It held that
[w]here, as here, the child's very life is threatened by a parental decision
refusing medical treatment, [the State's interest in the welfare of children]
clearly supersede[s] parental prerogatives.
[Furthermore], the State interest in the preservation of life applies with
full force. 186
The Massachusetts court's thoughtful opinion was sensitive to the
competing interests; however, the holding is clear that when a
child's life hangs in the balance, intervention will be ordered so
long as it holds a reasonable probability of success. 1s7
The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar result in People
in the Interest of D.L.E., s88 in which the teenage patient had a
serious seizure disorder. He refused on religious grounds to take
medication, and was supported in his resolve by his mother. His
decision placed "his life in imminent danger."' 8 9 The court con-
cluded that the state's parens patriae interest in guarding the
youth's well-being can override religious objection to medical care.
"[A] parent's election against medical treatment for a child is not
absolute in a life-endangering situation."' 90 Finding the boy ne-
glected, the court ordered therapy.
There are numerous cases of court ordered blood transfusions
for children of Jehovah's Witnesses.' 9' The decisions consistently




187. The parents eventually fled the jurisdiction rather than submit their son to court
ordered, traditional medical care. They went to a clinic in Tijuana, Mexico where the boy
received metabolic therapy. He died on October 12, 1979, at the age of three. Note, Judicial
Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 N a. L. REv.
1093, 1105 n.63 (1980).
188. 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (En Banc). The child had been before the Colorado
Supreme Court once before. In an earlier decision, People in the Interest of D.L.E., 614 P.2d
873 (Colo. 1980) (En Banc), the court reversed a juvenile court order that the child was
dependent and in need of medical care. The Supreme Court emphasized that its decision
not to impose medical care could well have been different if the child's life was endangered.
Id. at 874. In its later decision the minor's health had deteriorated to the point where medi-
cal care was essential to protect his life. 645 P.2d at 273.
189. 645 P.2d at 272.
190. Id. at 276.
191. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); Wallace v. Labranz, 411
IM. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 483, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
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require treatment when it is necessary to save the child's life. One
court held that "when a child's right to live and his parents' reli-
gious belief collide, the former is paramount, and the religious doc-
trine must give way."1192 One of the transfusion cases is particularly
important to the present inquiry regarding state interests in the
unborn. In Hoener v. Bertinato,1ee a complaint was filed under the
juvenile court act. The child welfare department alleged that the
defendant mother was pregnant and likely to deliver in a few days.
Unless her baby received a blood transfusion soon after birth, it
would die; however, the parents refused on religious grounds to
consent to the procedure. The court had "no difficulty in finding
that, by their refusal to consent to the blood transfusion, defen-
dants are neglecting to provide the child to be born with proper
protection within the meaning of" I" the law. The parens patriae
power, as codified by statute, gave the court ample authority to
impose medical care in opposition to the parent's genuinely held
religious beliefs. Importantly, the court held that it had jurisdic-
tion even though the child was unborn. Finding nothing in the ju-
venile code precluding its applicability to the unborn,'" the court
held "that the statute is applicable to the instant case even though
the child is not yet born. . . . [A]n unborn child's right to life and
health is entitled to legal protection. '  This brief review of cases
concerning life saving treatment demonstrates a seamless web of
authority. State interests outweigh parental autonomy when a
child's life is at stake, and when the proposed treatment will prob-
ably be efficacious.
192. In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ct. Com. Pleas Ohio 1962). This case is one of
many in which Jehovah's Witness parents refuse blood for their injured or ill child. The
court held it had statutory and inherent equitable authority to order blood transfusions over
the parents' religious objection. Id. at 130. The court observed, in dicta, that "one doesn't
have to work in a family court very long to learn that in countless circumstances a juvenile's
rights and interests at many points are at sharp variance with those of his parents." Id. at
130.
Refer to note 142, supra, where Dr. Mitchell S. Globus discusses the not infrequent need
for in utero blood transfusion. As this procedure becomes more common, it can be antici-
pated that Jehovah's Witnesses will oppose transfusion. When the life of a viable fetus de-
ponds on receipt of blood, the stage is set for a controversy over state imposed medical care.
193. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
194. 67 N.J. Super. at 518, 171 A.2d at 142.
195. Id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144.
196. Id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144-45. For a discussion of the Bertinato case, see supra
notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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2. Treatment Not Essential to Save the Child's Life
When parents refuse consent to medical care which is important
to the child's well-being but not essential to life, courts reach dif-
fering results. Cases turn on their unique facts. It is important to
note, however, that all courts recognize limited state authority to
intervene in non-life threatening situations. For example, a New
York intermediate appellate court wrote in 1933 that the state's
power "extends. . . to conservation of the health of children, their
physical well-being, as well as to the preservation of their lives.
'1' 97
Some years later, a New York trial judge concluded that the state
domestic relations act "clothed this court with the power to . . .
order an operation not only in an instance where the life of the
child is to be saved but also in instances where the health, the
limb, the person or the future of the child is at stake."1 8
In the 1955 decision In re Seiferth,1 19 a sharply divided Court of
Appeals of New York20 0 confronted a difficult case in which a four-
teen year old boy and his father resisted surgery deemed necessary
for the minor's future well-being. The child had a cleft palate and
harelip. When the father refused consent to surgical repair, the lo-
cal health department initiated neglect proceedings in the Chil-
dren's Court. The trial judge took great pains to ensure that the
boy and his father were apprised of the advantages of surgery. 01 In
the end, however, the boy decided he did not want the operation.
Finding that the surgery was not "emergent, 2 0 2 that it could be
successfully performed at a later date, and that the child had "ac-
quired convictions of his own," the trial judge dismissed the pe-
tition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority stated that
"[tihe Children's Court has power in drastic situations to direct
[an] operation over the objection of parents. '2 0' 4 It concluded, how-
ever, that the more prudent course in the instant case was to defer
to the decision of the child, his parent, and the trial judge. Little
"would be lost by permitting the lapse of several more years, when
the boy may make his own decision to submit to plastic surgery,
than might be sacrificed if he were compelled to undergo it now
197. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).
198. In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626-27 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
199. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
200. The court split four to three against court ordered medical care.
201. 309 N.Y. at 84-85, 127 N.E.2d at 822.
202. Id. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 821.
203. Id. at 84, 127 N.E.2d at 822.
204. Id. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
Vol. 23:1
Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn
against his sincere and frightened antagonism."2 5
In a strident dissent, Judge Fuld decried the majority's decision
to "place upon [the child's] shoulders one of the most momentous
and far-reaching decisions of his life. '20 6 He was of the opinion
that the court had shirked its responsibility to decide the best
course of action for the child.0 7 In his opinion, the parent had "ne-
glected in the most egregious way" 20 8 to do so; therefore, it was
incumbent on the court to authorize surgery needed to enhance the
child's "chances for a useful and productive life. '20 9 The dissent
placed great emphasis on the quality of life and the importance of
"a normal, useful life. '2 10 For Judge Fuld, the state's power to pro-
tect these values should have prevailed.
On reflection, the perception emerges that the Seiferth majority
reached the appropriate result. Judge Fuld's able dissent verges
too closely on unwarranted paternalism. The majority respected
the settled judgment of a parent and an adolescent boy capable of
reasoned decision-making. The fact that the surgery could be
delayed until the child reached majority weighed heavily in the
court's judgment. At the same time, the majority observed that
"one cannot be certain of being right under these circum-
stances."2"' In striving to reach the result that would serve the
child's best interest, the court looked to a wide array of factors,
and balanced them in light of the unique facts of the case. In doing
so it retained a degree of skepticism regarding state intervention
into matters of family privacy.
The Seiferth opinion highlights numerous factors considered in
medical care cases. Among the most important are the kind of
medical problem involved, whether it is progressive or stable, the
procedure necessary to treat it, the likelihood of success, the de-
gree of risk involved, whether it is possible to postpone treatment,
205. Id.
206. Id. at 88, 127 N.E.2d at 824 (Fuld, J., dissenting). Judge Fuld stated:
The boy Martin, twelve years old when this proceeding was begun, fourteen now,
has been neglected in the most egregious way. He is afflicted with a massive hare lip
and cleft palate which not only grievously detract from his appearance but seriously
impede his chances for a useful and productive life.
Id. at 86, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
207. Id. at 87, 127 N.E.2d at 823, 824. ("[It is the court which has a duty to perform
... and it should not seek to avoid that duty by foisting upon the boy the ultimate decision
to be made.")






whether psychological injury will befall the child without treat-
ment, the chances for a "normal" life with and without treatment,
the age and preference of the child, and the genuinely held reli-
gious beliefs of the child and his or her parents. 2 '
It is useful to compare the Seiferth case, which seems correctly
decided, with the more recent decision in In re Phillip B,21 3 which
seems erroneous. California juvenile authorities filed a petition al-
leging that Phillip was denied the necessities of life because his
parents refused consent to heart surgery. Evidence established that
while his life was not immediately endangered, his congenital heart
defect, if not corrected, would damage the lungs to the point where
they would be unable to oxygenate blood, causing death. During
the deterioration of the lungs, Phillip would suffer from a progres-
sive loss of energy, leading eventually to a bed-to-chair
existence.1
In concluding that state intervention was unwarranted, the court
emphasized the importance of parental autonomy.215 "Legal judg-
ments regarding the value of childrearing patterns should be kept
to a minimum so long as the child is afforded the best available
opportunity to fulfill his potential in society." '16 In balancing the
interests, the court weighed several factors, including "the serious-
ness of the harm the child is suffering, 2 1 7 the opinions of experts
regarding the proposed treatment, s "the risks involved,"2 9 the
212. Several excellent student articles discuss the factors relevant to medical care
cases. The authors suggest standards for decisionmaking. See Note, Choosing for Children:
Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
157 (1983); Comment, Relief for the Neglected Child: Court Ordered Medical Treatment in
Non-Emergency Situations, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 471 (1982); Note, Judicial Limitations
on Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L. REv. 1093 (1980);
Note, Judicial Power to Order Medical Treatment for Minors Over Objections of their
Guardians, 14 SYRAcusE L. REv. 84 (1962). See also Baker, Court Ordered Non-Emergency
Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEv.-MA. L. Rzv. 296 (1969); Goldstein, supra note 110.
213. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949
(1980). See generally Note, supra note 212, at 164; Baines, In re Phillip B.: Unequal Pro-
tection for the Retarded?, 4 Amcus 128 (1979); Comment, The Outer Limits of Parental
Autonomy: Withholding Medical Treatment for Children, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 824-26
(1981).
214. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
215. Id. ("It is fundamental that parental autonomy is constitutionally protected.")
216. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rep. at 51.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. The risks inherent in the cardiac surgery needed by Phillip were substantial
due to his mental retardation and the advanced stage of his heart disease. See id. at 803,
156 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52.
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preferences of the child, and the best interests of the child.22 0 The
seriousness of the harm was evident - a deteriorating condition
leading to a restricted, frustrating life, and early death. The doc-
tors opined that surgery was indicated. While the risks were sub-
stantial,"'1 the potential benefits were great. Since the child was
intellectually handicapped,2 22 he could not formulate an informed
preference regarding surgery, although he could say that childhood
activities were fun and that he liked them. Without surgery, he
would lose the ability to participate in such activities. The court
weighed these and other factors and concluded that the parents'
refusal to consent to surgery should be respected. It was no doubt
troubled with its decision, since it consigned Phillip to a downhill
course leading to the grave. While the court's deference to parental
decision-making is understandable, the case is so similar to those
in which the child's life is at stake that it seems incorrectly
decided.
Seiferth and Phillip B occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of
decisions denying state authority to provide medical care over pa-
rental objection. Why is one right and the other wrong? In Seiferth
the medical care sought by the state was not essential for a rela-
tively normal, satisfying life. Phillip B, on the other hand, forbade
care that was essential for the preservation of health and ability to
engage in normal boyhood activities. In the long run, Phillip would
die without the medical care sought by the state. Keeping in mind
the admonition that "[o]ne cannot be certain of being right"22' in
these difficult cases, the distinction between them rests on the fact
that one advanced the best interests of the child while the other
did not. Seiferth enhanced quality of life and avoided possible
harm. Phillip B relegated a child to a life of increasing disability
and decreasing enjoyment. Searching deeply for a sense of justice
and humanitarianism, one finds it in the former but not the latter.
As many cases allow intervention in non-life threatening situa-
tions as deny it.224 A leading case is In re Sampson,2 2 5 decided in
1970 by the New York Family Court. The fifteen year old child
220. Id.
221. See supra note 219.
222. Phillip had Down's Syndrome, an inherited disability causing mental retardation.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY: FIFTH UNABRIDGED LAWYERS' EDITION 1386 (1982).
223. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 85, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955).
224. See, e.g., In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
225. 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(N.Y. App. Term. 1971), afl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
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suffered "from extensive neurofibromatosis or Von Reck-
linghausin's disease which has caused a massive deformity of the
right side of his face and neck. '1 2" 6 His appearance "can only be
described as grotesque and repulsive. 2 2 7 His mother consented to
corrective plastic surgery, but because she was a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, she refused to permit essential blood transfusions. The physi-
cians concurred that surgery was indicated.22 They also agreed
that "insofar as his health and his life is concerned, this is not a
necessary operation [since the] disease poses no immediate threat
to his life nor has it yet seriously affected his general health."'
229
The trial court held that "[iut is not necessary . . . that a child's
life be in danger before this court may act to safeguard his health
or general welfare. '28 0 The court's discretionary power was broad
enough to require medical care in appropriate non-life threatening
cases.231 In reaching its decision, the court looked beyond protec-
tion of physical health to consideration of the possible psychologi-
cal and social ramifications of the boy's disability. In this vein the
court found that
226. 317 N.Y.S.2d at 643. Neurofibromatosis causes "small, discrete, pigmented skin
lesions ... that develop in infancy or early childhood, followed by development of multiple
slow-growing neurofibromas." STEDMAN'S MEicAL DIcTIONARY: FFTH UNABRIDGED LAWYERs'
EDITION 946 (1982). The reader may recall a recent film titled "The Elephant Man." The
character, portrayed by William Hurt, suffered from neurofibromatosis. See film review at
116 TInM 92 (Oct. 6, 1980). See Sm F. Timvs, THE ELEPHANT MAN, AND OTHER Rsmns-
CENCES (1923)(1980).
227. 317 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
228. Id. at 645.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 653.
231. Id. at 654. The court defined its authority as follows:
I therefore conclude that this court's authority to deal with the abused, neglected or
physically handicapped child is not limited to "drastic situations" or to those which
constitute a "present emergency", but that the Court has a "wide discretion" to order
medical or surgical care and treatment for an infant even over parental objection, if
in the Court's judgment the health, safety or welfare of the child requires it.
Id.
Professor Goldstein disagrees vehemently with the reasoning of the trial court in Samp-
son, accusing Judge Elwyn of unfounded psychologizing and prediction, "blind arrogance",
conjury, and false humility. Goldstein, supra note 110, at 665-67. These are strong words to
be leveled at a judge struggling to balance the competing interests in a difficult case. Evi-
dently Mr. Goldstein would not permit court ordered medical care in non-life threatening
cases. Id. at 664. With all due respect, the author rejects the Goldstein position. Interven-
tion must be rare in non-life threatening cases; however, to rule it out entirely is to turn a
deaf ear to children desperately in need of help. As stated by Justice Sampson in his dis-
senting opinion in In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 734, 126 P.2d 765, 792 (1942) (Sampson,
J., dissenting): "The courts should come to the child's rescue. She has no other friend able
to assist her."
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the massive deformity of the entire right "ide of his face and neck is pa-
tently so gross and so disfiguring that it must inevitably exert a most nega-
tive effect upon his personality development, his opportunity for education
and later employment and upon every phase of his relationship with his
peers and others.232
Finding that the child had a "right to live and grow up without
disfigurement - [a] right to live and grow up with a sound mind
in a sound body," 33 the court held that the mother's refusal to
consent to blood transfusions amounted to neglect.
Sampson was affirmed on appeal.'" At the intermediate appel-
late level, the mother argued that state intervention should be
"permitted only where the life of the child is in danger by a failure
to act. '23 5 The court stated that this "is a much too restricted ap-
proach. '223  The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that the "statu-
tory power of the Family Court or like court in neglect proceedings
.. . [is not limited] to drastic or mortal circumstances. 2  Courts
have "power to direct surgery even in the absence of risk to the
physical health or life of the subject .... ,,18
The Sampson decision is significant for several reasons. First, it
was decided by the same court that handed down Seiferth. The
different outcomes bear witness to the decisive importance of the
unique facts of such cases. Second, the case is important for its
sanction of judicial inquiry into a broad array of issues, including
medical, psychological, and social implications of granting or deny-
ing state requested treatment. Finally, the decision leaves no doubt
that courts may authorize medical care in non-life threatening
situations.
In Matter of Jensen,2 89 the Oregon Court of Appeals discussed
the appropriateness of involuntary surgical care to enhance quality
of life. The Jensen child was fifteen months old, and suffered from
hydrocephalus." 0 She was described as follows:
232. 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
233. Id. at 652 (emphasis omitted).
234. See supra note 225.
235. In re Sampson, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (N.Y. App. Term. 1971).
This argument was raised and rejected in Matter of Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302
(Or. Ct. App. 1981); and Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
236. Id.
237. In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1972).
238. Id. See Note, supra note 212, at 163-64 (describing New York law).
239. 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981).
240. Hydrocephalus is defined as follows: "1. A condition marked by an excessive ac-
cumulation of fluid dilating the cerebral ventricles, thinning the brain, and causing a separa-
tion of cranial bones. 2. In infants, an accumulation of fluid in the subarachnoid or subdural
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[T]he child's head has grown at an accelerated rate, and the child is unable
to sit up or to hold her head up unaided. The child has symptoms which
evidence increasing pressure on the brain, but her life is not in immediate
danger. However, if the condition is not treated, there is substantial likeli-
hood of retardation and other problems, and the possibility of the child
leading some semblance of normal life would be very small.2 '
If surgery were performed, there was a good chance the child
would escape the more severe consequences of her condition;
242
however, the parents objected on religious grounds. The trial court
ordered surgery, and the appellate court affirmed, stating that
"[t]he difference between providing and not providing indicated
medical treatment here, as far as human beings can know, may
well be the difference between providing or denying the child an
opportunity to enjoy a meaningful life. '24 3 Under such circum-
stances, the parent's objections "must yield."
2 44
space." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICMONARY: FIFTH UNABRmGED LAWYERS' EDITION 663 (1982).
See supra note 141. See infra notes 381-86 and accompanying text.
241. 54 Or. App. at 3, 633 P.2d at 1303.
242. Hydrocephalus can cause physical abnormalities and varying degrees of mental
retardation.
243. Id. at 6, 633 P.2d at 1305.
244. Id. at 8, 633 P.2d at 1306. The court was impressed by the fact that "[t]he risk of
post-surgical complications increases the longer surgery is delayed." Id. at 4, 633 P.2d at
1304. When time is of the essence, courts are more likely to authorize intervention.
On the issue of parental religious objection to the surgery, the court wrote:
While the parents' right to provide religious training for their children is constitu-
tionally protected, that right does not include as a necessary adjunct the right to
jeopardize their children's health or safety.
The line cannot always be easily drawn between the parental right to provide reli-
gious foundation for their children's lives and the right of children either to reject or
to be free of unwanted consequences of their parents' faith. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
supra. Presumably, no court would prohibit a parent from compelling a recalcitrant
six-year old to attend Sunday School; presumably no court would hesitate to enjoin
the sacrifice of a child to a volcano god. This case is not at either end of that spec-
trum. However, we conclude that given the child's inability to make her own choice
about the burdens she will sustain as a consequence of her parents' religious belief,
this burden the parents would impose on her in the interest of faith exceeds the
limits of their asserted religious and related family rights.
Id. at 7, 633 P.2d at 1305-06.
The parents argued that intervention would have been appropriate if the child's life were
endangered by withholding medical care. Since their daughter's life was not at risk, they
argued that the state's parens patriae authority was not strong enough to overcome their
right to free exercise of religion. The court rejected their position. It stated:
While we agree that not all events are equally grave, and that competing claims of
First Amendment liberties and the state's parens patriae role must obviously be
weighed in light of the gravity of the risk against which the state seeks to act, we do
not agree that the risk to the child in this case differs significantly in magnitude from
an immediate threat to life. The facts as we find them are that the most basic quality
of the child's life is endangered by the course the parents wish to follow. Their rights
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A third case helps illustrate the approach taken by judges in
non-life threatening situations. Application of Cicero245 concerned
an infant girl born with a spinal disorder called meningomy-
elocele' 4 6 Failure to surgically repair the defect could have led to
infection and possibly death. The court found that the "infant's
physical condition is in imminent danger of becoming impaired un-
less the recommended surgery is performed. '2 7 The court posed
the issue as whether "a child born with handicaps [should] be
given a reasonable opportunity to live, to grow and hopefully to
surmount those handicaps. 24' 8 Answering in the affirmative, the
court stated that "where, as here, a child has a reasonable chance
to live a useful, fulfilled life, the court will not permit parental in-
action to deny that chance.
2 4 9
The cases involving medical care for non-life threatening disor-
ders may not appear to be based on uniformly applied principles of
judicial decision-making. The reader comes away with the impres-
sion that decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, and that cases
cannot be reconciled with each other. However, close analysis
reveals a core of basic principles underlying the cases.250 The most
important is the degree of harm the child will suffer without court
ordered medical care. The greater the harm, the more likely the
court will intervene. When harm approaches threat to life, the
court's analysis shifts, and the judge relies on the uniform body of
law permitting intervention in life and death cases. Also of impor-
tance are the risks involved in the proposed treatment and the
likelihood of success. As the degree of risk inherent in treatment
increases, judges demonstrate greater deference to parental deci-
sion-making. 251 The same is true as the likelihood of successful
must yield.
Id. at 8, 633 P.2d at 1306. See In re Sampson, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972)
(similar argument raised and rejected).
245. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
246. Meningomyelocele, often called spina bifida, is defined as a protrusion of the
membranes and [spinal] cord through a defect in the vertebral column. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DIcTIoNARY: FIpTH UNABRIDGED LAWYERS' EDMON 854 (1982). The disorder can cause nu-
merous disabilities, including paralysis. For a description of a child with spina bifida, see
Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1979), vacated and remanded, 625 F.2d 557
(5th Cir. 1980), decision on remand, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 703 F.2d 823
(5th Cir. 1983), modified, 52 U.S.L.W. 5151 (U.S. June 26, 1984) (No. 83-558).
247. 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 968.
250. See authorities cited supra note 212.
251. See In re Quinlin, 70 N.J. 10, 40-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
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outcome decreases. Courts consider these principles in light of the
unique facts and equities of the case. The court ultimately rests its
decision on what it perceives as essential to protect the child from
harm and foster its best interests.
D. Religious Belief
Religious belief is often at the heart of medical care cases. Par-
ents argue that state enforced medical care violates the right to
believe and practice religion according to conscience; 25 2 however,
when religion precludes essential medical care, state interests in
children usually prevail. 53 This result can be traced to a distinc-
tion between freedom to believe in a particular religion and free-
dom to act pursuant to religious belief. In the 1878 case, Reynolds
v. United States,2 ' the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
an individual whose religious beliefs included the practice of polyg-
amy. Discussing the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, the Court stated that religious belief is beyond government
control, but action "in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order"255 may be prohibited. The distinction between belief
and action has direct application in the medical care cases. 256 In
Prince v. Massachusetts, '7 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
252. See, e.g., Matter of Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981). See supra notes
239-44 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., id. at 1306. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973).
254. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
255. Id. at 164.
256. See In re Appeal of Cochise County Juvenile Action, 133 Ariz. 157, 162-64, 650
P.2d 459, 464-66 (1982) (In Banc); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 462, 181 A.2d 751 (1962);
Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961); Com-
ment, supra note 145.
257. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court wrote that
the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of
religious liberty. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae
may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohib-
iting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on reli-
gion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for
the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E.
243. The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appel-
lant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes,
to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.
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right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
the. . . child. . . to ill health or death. . . . Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free
. . . to make martyrs of their children."2 58 The court reiterated
this position in Wisconsin v. Yoder,25 9 when it wrote that "the
power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may
be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health and safety of the child
"9260
Courts exhibit extraordinary deference to the right of parents to
inculcate religious belief in their children; however, when religion
leads to refusal to consent to essential medical care, the court will
intervene. "If there is a direct collision of a child's right to good
health and a parent's religious beliefs, the parent's rights must give
way.",2 61
E. Summary
Prenatal surgical and medical procedures are now available, and
significant new developments can be expected.262 When parents re-
fuse to consent to treatment required to save the life of the fetus
or prevent serious disability, courts will be called on to determine
whether their refusal may stand. In deciding such cases, judges can
draw substantial guidance from the well developed body of law on
medical care over parental objection. The principles enunciated in
the case law are applicable to cases involving the unborn, and
Id. at 166-67 (footnote omitted).
258. Id. at 166-67, 170.
259. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
260. Id. at 233-34. See People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (En
Banc), where the court wrote:
Acting to guard the general interest in the youth's well being, the authority of the
state, as parens patriae, is not nullified merely because a parent grounds his claim to
control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience .... The right to
practice religion freely does not include the right or liberty to expose the community
or the child to ill health or death.
Id. at 276. See also In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 344, 292 A.2d 387, 390 (1972) ("jurisdictions
have uniformly held that the state can order... blood transfusions over the parents' reli-
gious objections.").
261. In re Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action, 133 Ariz. 157, 164, 650 P.2d 459,
465 (1982) (In Banc). See Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King County Hosp., 278 F.
Supp. 488, 504-05 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598, rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 961
(1968); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970); People ex rel. Wallace
v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773-74, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison
v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
262. See authorities cited supra notes 141-42.
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should serve as an invaluable starting place for analysis. It is ap-
parent, however, that there are important interests involved in
prenatal medical care controversies which are not present in cases
where the child has been born. Subsequent sections discuss those
interests.
VIII. NON-MEDICAL CARE FORMS OF PRENATAL ABUSE AND
NEGLECT
Many maternal behaviors can cause fetal death or disability. For
example, maternal heroin addiction can cause addiction in the fe-
tus, with possible permanent injury.26 Heavy alcohol use can cause
a condition known as fetal alcohol syndrome.'" The syndrome can
lead to permanent physical abnormalities and mental retarda-
tion. 65 When a woman engages in such activities, there is a statis-
tically significant risk of serious fetal injury.2" Toward the other
end of the spectrum of risk, smoking, social drinking, poor nutri-
tion26 7 and inadequate prenatal care have been linked to fetal disa-
263. See Lipson, Contamination of the Fetal Environment-A Form of Prenatal
Abuse in CHILD ABUSE 42-48 (K. Oates ed. 1982); Harris & Srinivasan, Infants of Drug-
Dependent Mothers, 18 SEMINARS IN ROENTGENOLOGY 179 (1983). In the case of In re Baby
X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980), the court was concerned with an infant whose
mother was an addict. The child "began exhibiting symptoms of drug withdrawal ...
[w]ithin 24 hours of birth." Id. at 113, 293 N.W.2d at 738. The court affirmed a trial court
ruling that the infant was neglected. Significantly, the court held that acts of neglect occur-
ring during gestation could be relied upon to find the child born alive to be neglected. In the
court's words, "a newborn suffering narcotic withdrawal symptoms as a consequence of pre-
natal maternal drug addiction may properly be considered a neglected child .... " Id. at
116, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
264. See Bader & Weitzman, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 60 Am. J. OPTOMWRY & PHYSI-
OLOOICAL OPTIcs 542 (1983); Mackenzie, Collins & Popkin, A Case of Fetal Abuse?, 52 Am. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 699 (1982); Stanage, Gregg & Massa, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
-Intrauterine Child Abuse, 36 S.D. J. MED. (1982).
265. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
266. See Lipson, Contamination of the Fetal Environment-A Form of Prenatal
Abuse in CHILD ABusE 42-48 (K. Oates ed. 1982).
267. A recent California Court of Appeal case addresses the issue of poor prenatal
nutrition. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Defendant mother was
convicted of child endangerment. She adhered to a strict diet, and enforced the diet on her
young children. The trial court found that she had failed to provide adequate nutrition for
her children. As a condition of probation the trial court ordered that the woman not con-
ceive a child during the probationary period. Id. at 358. The court's unusual order was en-
tered to protect the public's interest in avoidance of prenatal injury which could result from
the mother's dietary habits. The appellate court disapproved of this condition, holding that
it was impermissibly overbroad since "less restrictive alternatives are available that would
feasibly provide the protections the trial court properly believed necessary." Id. at 366. In-
terestingly, the court's "less restrictive alternatives" included the probability of involuntary
prenatal treatment, including an appropriate diet. The court wrote that
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bility and mortality."'
Nothing in this article is intended to convey the impression that
the state is or should be authorized to intervene in a woman's
pregnancy to curtail all forms of prenatal activity statistically
linked with some degree of risk to the fetus. Such a position is
inconsistent with basic constitutional principles. Still, when relia-
ble scientific evidence clearly establishes that maternal conduct
carries with it a very high probability of fetal death or serious disa-
bility, intervention may be appropriate.260 It is suggested that as
courts decide such cases they will focus primarily on the likelihood
and severity of fetal harm °70 and the degree of invasion of pro-
tected maternal interests required to effectuate intervention. A
delicate balancing will be undertaken, with the outcome in most
cases being a decision against intervention.7 1
IX. PARENTAL RIGHTS
Parents have a constitutional right to the care, custody and con-
trol of their children.72 In a 1922 case, Meyer v. Nebraska,2 " the
[tihe challenged condition was apparently not intended to serve any rehabilitative
purpose but rather to protect the public by preventing injury to an unborn child. We
believe this salutary purpose can adequately be served by alternative restrictions less
subversive of appellant's fundamental right to procreate. Such less onerous conditions
might include, for example, the requirement that appellant periodically submit to
pregnancy testing; and that upon becoming pregnant she be required to follow an
intensive prenatal and neonatal treatment program monitored by both the probation
officer and by a supervising physician.
Id. at 365.
268. See Lipson, Contamination of the Fetal Environment-A Form of Prenatal
Abuse in CHnD Anusa 42-48 (K. Oates ed. 1982).
269. See Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
270. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
271. It is the author's thesis that intervention will be the rare exception and not the
rule in prenatal abuse and neglect cases.
272. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). For discussion of parental
rights, see generally, Stankoski v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977); Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Utah
1982) ("A parent has a 'fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, to sustain his
relationship with his child.' "); Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections on
and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MNN. L. REv. 487-501 (1982); Levy, The
Rights of Parents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 693; Wald, supra note 110; Note, Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding County Hospital Authority: Court-Ordered Surgery to Protect the Life of an Un-
born Child, 9 Am. J.L. & MFa. 83, 92-94 (1983); Note, Protected Interests and Fundamen-
tal Rights in the Era of Human Genetic Engineering, 10 SAN. FERN. V. L. REV. 119 (1982);
Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. Rev.
1383, 1384-87 (1974); Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal
Care, 67 VA. L. Rzv. 1051, 1061-64 (1981).
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Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment protects pa-
rental liberty to "establish a home and bring up children."" 4 A few
years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,75 it wrote that the state
could not
unreasonably interfere... with the liberty of parents and guardians to di-
rect the upbringing and education of children under their control.
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional obligations."' 6
The Court summarized the teaching of earlier authorities in its
seminal decision in Prince v. Massachusetts:27 7 "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.
'27 8
While parental autonomy is of utmost importance to society, it
is not unlimited. In Prince the Court wrote that the "state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare, ' 27 ' and in Parham v. J.R., 2S it
held "that a state is not without constitutional control over paren-
tal discretion in dealing with children when their physical or
mental health is jeopardized. ' 281 When parents fail to meet their
basic duty to provide for their children, or when they abuse or neg-
lect them, the state may step in to fill the vacuum of responsibility.
Within its "wide range" of "constitutional control over parental
discretion" a state may take action to protect the unborn from
abuse and neglect. The propriety of intervention will be weighed in
light of the intrusion on parental and other rights. In a minority of
cases, the fundamental constitutional rights of parents will yield
when balanced against the interests of the state and the unborn
child. This result does nothing to undermine parental autonomy. It
merely extends to the unborn the undisputed power of the state to
intervene in the family to prevent serious abuse and neglect.
273. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
274. Id. at 399.
275. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
276. Id. at 534-35.
277. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
278. Id. at 166.
279. Id. at 167.
280. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
281. Id. at 603.
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X. RIGHTS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN
State interference in a woman's pregnancy is a frightening pro-
position. It is difficult to imagine a more personal and private ex-
perience than carrying a child.2 " Yet, the fact that two lives are
involved requires analysis of competing interests. This section out-
lines the rights protecting the pregnant woman from state
intervention.283
A. The Right of Privacy
The roots of the constitutional right of privacy can be traced to
the nineteenth century;28 4 however, its formulation in Supreme
Court decisions is of fairly recent origin. One of the earliest pro-
nouncements is from the dissenting pen of Justice Harlan in Poe v.
Ullman. 15  Several individuals challenged Connecticut's law
against contraceptive use by married couples. The majority de-
clined to reach the merits. Justice Harlan would have struck down
the statute.28 In his judgment it was "an intolerable and unjustifi-
able invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate con-
cerns of an individual's personal life. ' 287 He wrote that "the sweep
of the Court's decisions . . . amply shows that the Constitution
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion
of whatever character. 2 88 The right of family privacy is inherent
282. As a male, I, of course, lack personal knowledge of the experience. I merely hope
to articulate the issues involved in abuse and neglect of the unborn. I hope I am not pre-
sumptuous in so doing.
283. See Lenow, supra note 5, at 19-24 (1983).
284. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). See also Union Pacific Ry. v. Bot-
sford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), where the Court stated that
[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, "[tihe right to one's person may be said
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
Id. at 251. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 734-65
(2d ed. 1983); L. Tams, AMEmRcAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAW 886-990 (1978); Warren & Brandeis,
The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 191 (1890).
285. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
286. Id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 539. Justice Harlan observed that the Court had not directly addressed the
right of privacy in its decisions up to that time. Id.
288. Id. at 550. Justice Harlan quotes at length from the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), as follows:
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 23:1
in the tradition and fabric of American society; therefore, the con-
stitutional guarantee of due process of law sets limits on the extent
the sovereign may intrude into such matters.18 This is especially
so regarding private sexual conduct between wife and husband.
While he would have invalidated the Connecticut statute, Justice
Harlan made it clear that constitutional privacy does not extend to
all privately conducted activity. "[A]dultery, homosexuality, forni-
cation and incest are [not] immune from criminal enquiry, however
privately practiced. 2 9 0 The home cannot "be made a sanctuary of
crime. "291 The limits of the right of privacy are found by examin-
ing societal values and determining which private activities are tra-
ditionally sanctioned and which proscribed. The state must have
compelling reasons to trammel the former.
Four years after it declined to do so in Poe v. Ullman, the Su-
preme Court struck down the Connecticut contraception statute as
an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut292
the Court stated that the statute impinged on "a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several constitutional guar-
antees."29 3 While the Justices did not agree on the textual source
of the privacy right,294 they concurred that intimate family deci-
sions are protected. The right of privacy was clarified in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird ,25 a decision striking down a Massachusetts statute
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
289. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
290. 367 U.S. at 552. Since Justice Harlan's 1961 dissenting opinion, the right of pri-
vacy has been employed to strike down statutes which might well have survived his scrutiny.
See, e.g., New York v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981) (state statute criminalizing heterosexual sodomy between consenting adults held
unconstitutional): Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy between consenting adults held unconstitutional). But see Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S.
901 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of Virginia sodomy statute). See also State v.
Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (state sodomy statute struck down); State v. Saunders,
75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1976) (state fornication statute held unconstitutional).
291. 367 U.S. at 552.
292. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
293. Id. at 485.
294. For a discussion of the views of the Justices, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTrrtToNAL LAW 737-39 (2d ed. 1983).
295. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection grounds rather
than a privacy theory. While the passage quoted in the text is dicta, it remains an excellent
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prohibiting sale or distribution of contraceptives to a single person.
The Court wrote that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."2 ' A year after Eisenstadt, the Court handed down Roe v.
Wade,97 in which it held that the right of privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy." 2'' 1 Finally, in the 1977 decision, Whalen v.
Roe,"' a unanimous Court summarized the development of the law
as follows: "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'pri-
vacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." 00 The "decisions" entitled
to protection from governmental control are those "dealing with
'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family re-
lationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas, it has
been held that there are limitations on the States' power to sub-
stantively regulate conduct.'""
This brief review of the developing law of constitutional privacy
leads ineluctably to the conclusion that a pregnant woman has a
fundamental right to privacy in decision-making about her preg-
nancy. In Justice Brandeis' words, she has "the right to be let
alone .. .. "0 Government intrusion into her privacy can be sanc-
tioned only in compelling cases.
B. The Rights of Bodily Integrity and Personal Security
Closely associated with the right of privacy are the rights of bod-
ily integrity03 and personal security from unwarranted governmen-
expression of the importance of the privacy right.
296. Id. at 453.
297. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
298. Id. at 153. The Court in Roe stated that the constitutional right of privacy is
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty ...... " Id.
299. 429 U.S. 389 (1977).
300. Id. at 598-600 (footnote omitted).
301. Id. at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
302. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
303. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Note, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for
Judicial Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065, 1072-74 (1983); Note, Constitutional Limitations
on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1053-56 (1981). See also
Soloff, Jewell & Roth, Civil Commitment and the Rights of the Unborn, 136 AM. J. PsYCHI-
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tal intrusion. In Ingraham v. Wright °4 the Court observed that
the fourteenth amendment was intended to protect the "right to
be free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security."30 5
Every individual enjoys the basic rights to "autonomy over [his or
her] own body,"306 freedom "from nonconsensual invasion of...
bodily integrity"307 and preservation of the inviolabilty of the per-
son. 08 These rights are protected by the fourteenth amendment.
They empower a woman to resist governmentally imposed regula-
tion of her conduct during pregnancy. They also form the constitu-
tional underpinning of the right of a competent adult to refuse
medical care imposed by the government.309 Under their protec-
tion, a woman may refuse medical or surgical care 10 needed by her
unborn child unless her rights are overcome by compellingly strong
state interests.
C. Liberty and Freedom from Bodily Restraint
The fourteenth amendment protects the fundamental rights to
liberty 11 and freedom from unwarranted bodily restraint.312 State
action to curtail a woman's freedom in order to protect her fetus
ATRY 114 (1979) (schizophrenic woman who denied she was pregnant validly committed to
protect her unborn child) [hereinafter cited as Soloff].
304. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of school children).
305. Id. at 673.
306. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (concerning refusal of
antipsychotic drugs by civilly committed mental patient), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d
836 (1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
307. Superintendent of Belchentown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417,
424 (1977). See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
308. 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
309. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, vacated and remanded, sub nom., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), va-
cated and remanded, sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131 (D. N.J. 1978) (for procedural history see supra note 306) Guardianship of Roe,
421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re K.K.B., 609
P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980); Note, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority:
Court-Ordered Surgery to Protect the Life of an Unborn Child, 9 Am. J.L. & MED. 83, 90-92
(1983); Comment, Family Law-Court-Ordered Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fe-
tus, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 125, 126-32 (1982).
310. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Like most rights, it is not
absolute, but is limited by other legitimate governmental concerns and obligations."); Ren-
nie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1145 ("The constitutional right to refuse treatment cannot be
absolute.").
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." Id.
312. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Cases of court ordered medical
care for an unborn child could implicate the mother's constitutional right to travel. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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runs directly afoul of these rights.
D. Parental Rights
As described above, 1 s a parent has a fundamental right to the
care, custody and control of her child. This right of parental auton-
omy applies to the expectant mother with as much force as it does
to parents of children already born. When this parental right is
added to the personal rights described above, the woman comes
under the aegis of constitutional limitations on government inter-
ference with her pregnancy. The right of the individual "to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion in fundamental personal
matters"814 is at its strongest in this context.
XI. RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN CHILD
Children unquestionably possess legal rights,31 5 and while they
are not conterminous with those of adults,"' they are substantial.
For example, children are entitled to the protection of the four-
teenth amendment.117  The Supreme Court has said that
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magi-
cally only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Mi-
nors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and pos-
sess constitutional rights."3 18 In addition to constitutional rights,
children are protected by the law of tort, crimes, and inheritance.
Because of their special status, they also enjoy an array of "chil-
dren's laws," such as child labor laws 19 and abuse and neglect
statutes.
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court held that a fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment;820
313. See supra note 263-71 and accompanying text.
314. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D. Mass. 1979).
315. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967). See generally M. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF
CHILDREN (1983); THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (R. Bremner ed. 1974); Children and the
Law, 39 LAw & CoNTZms. PROBS., passim (1975).
316. See Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond
the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. Rav. 459, 467-68 (1982).
317. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
318. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (minor has constitutional
privacy right to consent to abortion; parents may not veto her decision).
319. Child labor laws are an example of statutes designed specially to protect children.
For a history of the child labor movement, see W. TRArrHR, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN
(1970) (emphasis on the National Child Labor Committee).
320. 410 U.S. at 158. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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therefore, the unborn child is not entitled to the constitutional
rights of privacy, freedom from unwarranted government intrusion,
and bodily integrity. Despite its lack of constitutional rights, the
unborn child is protected by substantive non-fourteenth amend-
ment law."2 1 The most important sources of protection are tort and
child abuse and neglect laws. 2 When parents fail to protect their
unborn child, the state may employ these substantive provisions in
conjunction with its interests in the unborn to intervene on behalf
of the fetus. In this respect, the unborn child may be said to pos-
sess a right to protection from tortious injury, abuse, and neglect.
Put another way, the unborn child possesses a right to gestation
undisturbed by wrongful injury, and a right to be born with a
sound mind and body, 23 free from parentally inflicted abuse or
neglect. Recognition of such rights is consistent with the state's
compelling interest in viable fetal life, and with societal interests in
prevention of needless harm and protection of health. Further-
more, such rights are consistent with the movement toward greater
protection of children and enhanced recognition of children's legal
rights as individuals separate and apart from their parents. While
the fetus is fundamentally dependent on the woman, as it grows in
maturity, and especially when it reaches viability, its independent
existence and legally cognizable rights come progressively into fo-
cus. A right to gestation free from abuse or neglect which could
lead to death or disability should be recognized and protected. 2
The fetus is incapable of articulating or protecting its interest in
freedom from parental abuse or neglect, therefore, it falls to the
state, through its parens patriae authority, to protect the unborn.
When state intervention is contemplated to prevent abuse or neg-
lect, the interests of the fetus will dovetail with those of the state,
adding force to the argument in favor of intervention.
XII. RIGHTS OF THE FATHER
When the state intervenes in a woman's pregnancy to curtail
321. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 5; notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
323. See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 400, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1981); Wo-
mack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 723, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971); In re Sampson, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ct. Comm. Pleas.
Ohio 1962); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (Juv. & Dom. ReL
Ct. N.J. 1961); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
324. The scope of fetal rights is unclear. See Robertson, supra note 10, at 360; Note,
The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for Judicial Intervention, 14
PAc. L.J. 1065, 1075 (1983).
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abuse or neglect, the question arises whether the father has legal
rights which must be considered. In Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth"'6 the Supreme Court acknowledged "the deep and proper
concern and interest that a devoted and protective husband has in
his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fe-
tus she is carrying. 32 6 Many unwed fathers display similar con-
cern.3 17 While the father's interest in the unborn child is real, it is
not identical with that of the woman, for it is she "who physically
bears the child and who is more directly and immediately affected
by the pregnancy. 3 28 In the face of state intervention, it is she
whose personal rights to privacy, liberty, and bodily integrity are
directly affected. Clearly, intervention is substantially more intru-
sive on the rights of the pregnant woman than on those of the
father.
Granting the mother's constitutional rights greater status does
not decide the rights of the father. At a minimum, he is entitled to
the constitutionally protected right of a parent to freedom from
unwarranted government intrusion. 29 However, this right is lim-
ited in two important respects. First, the state's interest in chil-
dren and in potential human life overcome parental rights in ap-
propriate circumstances; therefore, the state's interests will
sometimes outweigh those of the father. Furthermore, when the
mother joins the state in opposition to the father, the combined
interests will nearly always prevail. Second, where the state is not
involved, and a controversy exists between a mother and father,
the woman's greater rights will usually predominate. The clearest
example is a woman's decision to abort pre-viable fetus over the
father's objection. It is settled that she may do so.830 The balance
of rights and interests may be closer following viability. For exam-
ple, if a woman eight months pregnant decides to engage in binge
325. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
326. Id. at 69.
327. On the rights of unwed fathers, see generally Kapp, The Father's (Lack of)
Rights and Responsibilities in the Abortion Decision: An Examination of Legal-Ethical
Implications, 9 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 369 (1982); Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the Unwed
Father: The Boundaries Are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445 (1980-81); Comment, Family
Law-Cox v. Hendricks: Rights of an Unwed Father, 15 CRMGHTON L. REv. 296 (1981);
Comment, The Unwed Father's Parental Rights and Obligations After S.P.B.: A Retreat in
Constitutional Protection, 60 DENVER L.J. 659 (1983); Comment, Lehr v. Robertson, A Con-
stricted View of the Rights of Putative Fathers, 4 PACE L. REv. 477 (1984).
328. 428 U.S. at 71.
329. See supra notes 272-81 and accompanying text.
330. 428 U.S. at 71. See Jones v. Smith, 278 So.2d 339 (Ct. App. Fla. 1973) (father of
unborn child could not restrain mother from seeking an abortion).
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drinking likely. to result in fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition that
can cause permanent physical and mental disability," ' it can be
argued that the father's parental rights should be elevated, in some
cases, to equal those of the mother.3 2 In such instances, a combi-
nation of paternal and state interests could tip the scale against
the mother and in favor of intervention to curtail her consumption
of alcohol.
In summary, the rights of the father are fewer in number and
weaker than those of the mother because he does not carry the
child within his body. In a contest between father and mother, the
outcome will depend in part on the age of the fetus. When the
state is aligned with the father in an effort to provide care for a
viable fetus or to curtail neglectful maternal conduct, the combina-
tion of interests may, in limited circumstances, prevail over those
of the woman.
XIII. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The time has come to return to the question posed at the outset.
When, if ever, can the state intervene in the life of a pregnant wo-
man to curtail abuse or neglect of her unborn child? The answer
reveals itself when the competing interests are scrutinized in light
of the balancing s approach utilized in cases dealing with rights
protected by fourteenth amendment substantive due process. 8"
The rights enjoyed by the pregnant woman are unquestionably
protected by substantive due process. 35 These rights must be bal-
anced against the state's interest in the unborn child." 6 As the de-
gree of state intervention becomes more intrusive on the woman's
rights, the state must demonstrate an increasingly strong justifica-
tion for its action.3 7 In most cases of intervention to curtail prena-
tal abuse and neglect, the degree of intrusion will be such that only
331. See authorities cited supra note 141.
332. Following viability, the state may compel the mother to give birth to the fetus.
The resulting child will become the personal and financial responsibility of both parents.
The father's interests in the child which will be born, and which the mother cannot abort,
become very immediate. Since the child will soon be his responsibility, it can be argued that
his rights regarding the fetus should increase along with the surety that his responsibilities
will accrue.
333. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L.
Rav. 1156, 1166-87, 1193-97 (1980). See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
334. See Developments, supra note 333, at 1193-97.
335. See supra notes 282-314 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 58-88 and accompanying text.
337. See Developments, supra note 333, at 1195.
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a compelling state interest will justify intervention. 83 8 What is
more, even in cases where the state is able to demonstrate compel-
ling justification for intervention, the court may stay the state's
hand if the goal sought by the proposed intervention can be ac-
complished by means less invasive of protected interests.33 9 The
difficult task of the court will be to weigh all the relevant inter-
estss 0 and make a decision tailored to the unique facts of the case
under consideration. 41 While use of the balancing approach does
not produce ease of decision-making, it does provide a workable
mechanism to reach just results in light of competing interests.
Several important factors align in favor of limited intervention.
The state has a compelling interest in the potentiality of viable
fetal life.3 42 This interest is so powerful that it overcomes the wo-
man's fundamental privacy right to terminate her pregnancy.3 43 In
effect, the state can compel birth.3 " Unless the health or safety of
the mother dictate otherwise,34 5 the state may require her to sus-
tain viable fetal life and give birth. Once the child is born, the
state's interests in preservation of life and protection from abuse
and neglect unquestionably attach. No one denies the state's inter-
ests in a nine minute old infant.346 There is no persuasive logical or
legal reason to deny them in a nine month old fetus. To inject
meaning into the state's compelling interest in the potentiality of
viable fetal life, 47 and to render it consistent with the interests in
338. Prevention of prenatal abuse or neglect will often require involuntary medical
care for the mother or substantial interference with privacy and autonomy. Such interfer-
ence with basic parental and personal rights can only be justified in compelling cases.
339. See Developments, supra note 333, at 1195, where it is stated that "[a]s an intru-
sion becomes more destructive of a right, it may be outweighed only by increasingly sub-
stantial state interests, and the degree of fit demanded between means and ends will in-
crease as well." (footnotes omitted). See also People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
340. Developments, supra note 333, at 1196.
341. Id. at 1197.
342. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 154, 155, 162 (1973).
343. Id. at 163-64.
344. See authority cited supra note 139.
345. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
346. This article does not deal with the controversy over defective newborns. There is
lively debate among philosophers, physicians, theologians, legislators, and lawyers regarding
who, if anyone, can decide whether a defective newborn child will live. See Matter of Weber,
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186 (1983); Parness & Stevenson, Let Live and Let Die: Dis-
abled Newborns and Contemporary Law, 37 U. MIAmI L. Rav. 43 (1982). Note, Defective
Newborns and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Legislation by Administrative Fiat?,
25 ARIz. L. Rav. 709 (1983).
347. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
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youth," 8 preservation of life,""" and protection from abuse and
neglect, the state must be authorized to extend limited protection
to the unborn. To have power to require birth, but not to protect
the soon-to-be-born from injury which will follow it throughout life
is inconsistent with the interests of the state and the child in free-
dom from preventable injury. Allowing intervention protects and
fosters both.
The right of the fetus to be born with a sound mind and body,
free from tortious or abusive injury, lends further support to the
argument for parens patriae intervention.3 50 Completely unable to
assert its own rights, the fetus depends on its parents for protec-
tion. When they fail, the state must step in. In the case of a viable
fetus, injured at its mother's hand, the rationale underlying the
parens patriae authority-protection of those incapable of self-
protection-comes squarely into play.3 51 Combining the state's in-
terest in and duty to protect children from abuse and neglect with
its important interests in the fetus produces a persuasive argument
for limited authority to prevent prenatal abuse and neglect. The
argument is strengthened further when the father adds his paren-
tal interest in the welfare of the fetus 52 to those of the state and
child.
Recognition of limited state authority to prevent abuse and neg-
lect of the unborn is consistent with the movement toward greater
recognition of children's rights. 853 It is also in line with the increas-
ing knowledge of prenatal life and science's rapidly expanding abil-
ity to provide efficacious medical and surgical care for the fetus.3"
Finally, arguments based on humanitarianism speak in favor of
opening the door to intervention. When science holds forth relief
from needless suffering, disfigurement, or disability, humanity,
supported by law, requires action.
Balanced against intervention is the panoply of rights possessed
by the mother.38 5 Added to this arsenal is a skepticism about the
will and ability of government to restrain itself from unwarranted
paternalistic intervention in the private lives of citizens.3 5 While
348. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 325-32 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 282-314 and accompanying text.
356. Justice Louis D. Brandeis once observed that the tendency of government offi-
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the mother's right to refuse state interference in her pregnancy is
strong, it is submitted that when viability is attained, the com-
bined interests of state and child will sometimes outweigh her
prerogative.
XIV. LIMITATIONS ON STATE INTERVENTION
Because of the importance of the rights at stake, and because
the government has a propensity for unwarranted intrusion into
areas of protected privacy and decision-making, it is necessary to
circumscribe the power of the state.
A. Intervention is Permissible Only Following Viability
Under current doctrine, the protected interests of the woman ex-
ist at full strength throughout gestation, while those of the state
become compelling only at viability. 57 Prior to that time the state
cials to overreach the limits of appropriate intervention in the private lives of citizens often
manifests itself when government is attempting to be beneficent. He wrote: "Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes
are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
357. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). See King, The Judicial Status of the
Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. Rav. 1647 (1979). Pro-
fessor King argues persuasively for protection of the viable fetus. She states that
In my view, the fetus should not be entitled to the same degree of protection at every
stage of development We should distinguish between the legal protection afforded
the viable and the previable fetus just as we once distinguished between legal protec-
tion furnished before and after birth....
[Rjeview of the medical data suggests a number of points in fetal development at
which one might recognize a strong claim for significantly increasing the legal protec-
tion given a developing human. I would argue that, absent powerful countervailing
considerations, the point selected should reflect the fundamental principles underly-
ing the present legal system-principles that warrant revised rules to keep pace with
recent medical advances.
As I noted earlier, the law has traditionally considered the acquisition of a capacity
for independent existence to be the significant point in human development. Tradi-
tionally, birth was the point at which the capacity criterion was satisfied. Today via-
bility precedes birth, and therefore birth is no longer the event most appropriately
satisfying the capacity criterion. Viability is preferable to birth, because, as we saw
earlier, there is no relevant difference between a viable fetus and a newborn. Explicit
substitution of viability for birth as the point at which important legal protections
vest would not establish a new principle. It would adhere to the traditional principle,
invoking a more precise formulation of the standard in response to modern medical
information and capabilities....
[S]ociety has never wholly disregarded the interests of those less mature. It has
always sought to strike a fair balance and has typically done so at that point in devel-
opment where the entity shows a significant likelihood of becoming a mature, contrib-
uting member. That point has, logically, been the moment at which the entity is ca-
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lacks sufficient justification to warrant intrusion into areas of pro-
tected privacy. This position is opposed by the stark reality that
prenatal abuse and neglect can occur throughout pregnancy. Since
fetal damage can be substantial and permanent when injury occurs
prior to viability, state authority to intervene should exist through-
out the period of vulnerability. 58 It makes little sense to force the
pable of independent existence-the capacity criterion. The criterion is thus a
rational one-it represents a societal commitment to bestowing rights on those likely
to contribute to its advancement. It naturally follows the societal instinct for self-
perpetuation. It explains the early common law property rule that one had to be alive
at the time of a testator's death to inherit; otherwise no one would fulfill the feudal
responsibilities. Similarly, modern law gives rights to artificial entities such as corpo-
rations only when they are capable of bearing responsibilities.
Thus, the capacity criterion is a rational principle, and the viability standard is a
rational application of that principle to the modern world. Yet that should not ob-
scure the arguments in Section IV above: Although principal rights should be be-
stowed at viability, the previable fetus should still receive some protection. Where the
protectable interests of fully mature members do not conflict with those of less ma-
ture members, there is no justification for ignoring the latter's claims. The Roe opin-
ion was correct in recognizing a state's legitimate interest in protecting the previable
fetus. In tort, property, and criminal law, when that interest does not oppose a pro-
tected interest of the mature mother, the state should not hesitate to vindicate it.
Id. at 1673, 1676-77.
358. Dr. Donald C. Bross, staff attorney for the National Center for the Prevention &
Treatment of Child Abuse & Neglect, Denver, Colorado, takes the position that pre-viability
state intervention is sometimes warranted. Bross argues as follows:
A number of legal principles are variations on a common theme: rights not exer-
cised can be lost with the passage of time. Among the definitions of "waiver" pro-
vided by Black's Law Dictionary are the following: "The intentional or voluntary re-
linquishment of a known right... or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right ...or when one dispenses with the performance of
something he is entitled to exact or when in possession of any right, whether con-
ferred by law or contract. . . does or forbears to do something the doing of which or
the failure of forebearance to do which is inconsistent with the right. . . .The renun-
ciation, repudiation, abandonment, or surrender of some claim, right, privilege ...
(citation omitted)." Another principle based on the passage of time is "laches," de-
fined as a "question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced. . . an inequity
founded on some change in the condition or the relations of. . .the parties.
Laches is, or is based on, delay attended by or inducing change of condition or
relation . . . delay for such time as to constitute acquiescence. . . .(citations omit-
ted)." (Black's Law Dictionary). The notion of waiver or laches is implicit in the lan-
guage of a federal district court which upheld the right of a woman to abortion,
before the Roe v. Wade decision:
"The essential requirement of due process is that the woman be given the power to
determine within an appropriate period after conception whether or not she wishes to
bear a child." (Abele v. Markel) In addition to merely waiting until one's right to an
abortion becomes physically or legally unenforceable, clear statements or actions to
waive the abortion right should be considered as creating a right in the developing
fetus to at least minimally adequate prenatal care.
Once a pregnant woman makes clear that she will carry the unborn child to term,
an argument can be made that a court should be able to order the woman to maintain
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state to sit powerless while a pregnant woman inflicts irreparable
injury on her fetus simply because the child is a month or a day
a medically necessary regimen, or to control exposure of the fetus to damaging drugs
and alcohol. Failure to do so would constitute evidence of child neglect at the child's
birth. The mother may defy the courts during the first trimester and decide to have
an abortion. The child advocate would then be in the position of feeling that when
intervention was undertaken, the developing fetus had a right to die rather than to be
born at extreme risk for deformities, pain or incapacity of the magnitude associated
with adult right-to-die situations.
On the horizon are cases in which intrauterine surgery or transfusions are indi-
cated. Additional discoveries may provide additional examples of parental conduct or
neglect clearly risking the health of term fetuses. Until now, the question of parental
negligence affecting the early fetus or first and second trimester developing child has
been set aside. Presumably, the abortion decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have
made early pregnancy a closed book legally for all except those who take a strong
right to life position. In the words of one commentator:
"To date the law has not adopted a uniform position concerning the legal
rights of a fetus. For some purposes, a fetus will be accorded legal protection
from the point of conception, entitled to the same damages awarded other per-
sons. For other purposes, the legal status of the fetus will not be recognized
until it has achieved viability. The constitutional right of the woman to con-
trol the pregnancy prior to the 'moment' of viability effectively negates any
legal interest that could be asserted on behalf of the fetus. Upon viability, a
medical determination, the fetus is entitled to the full protection of the law."
(Doudera) (Emphasis added)
It is possible, however, to accept the basic approach of Roe v. Wade and yet argue
that some child protective actions can be taken judicially to protect even the early
fetus.
Protection of First Term Fetuses
As more is learned about the effects of alcohol, narcotics, and other chemicals on
the fetus during early pregnancy, concern for these children is likely to increase. In a
case presented to the author for consultation, the same woman had had three known
pregnancies, all of which led either to spontaneous abortion or neonatal death be-
cause of sever, diagnosed complications of fetal alcohol syndrome. When she became
pregnant for the fourth time, protective services, medical personnel, and lawyers were
presented with the question of whether anything could or should be done to protect
the developing fetus during the first trimester. From a child advocacy perspective, it
can be argued that the right to an abortion is lost with the passage of time or other
acts which make clear that the option to abort will not be exercised. The woman in
this case had apparently decided not to go ahead with an abortion. The U.S. Supreme
Court decisions on abortion give legal recognition to a natural, physiological process,
with the emphasis on process. The process of pregnancy leads to birth of a child
unless the process is deliberately or spontaneously interrupted. As the process ad-
vances, the mother's own health usually will be in greater jeopardy if the pregnancy is
completed than if it is interrupted during the late second term.
Bross, Court-Ordered Intervention on Behalf of Unborn Children (un-published
manuscript).
While there is much to be said for the Bross position, it is felt that the balance of inter-
ests under present law cannot accomodate his aruments. Policies supporting maternal pri-
vacy prior to viability are simply too strong to be overcome by a waiver or laches argument.
See Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 Va. L. Rev.
1051, 1066-67 (1981).
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shy of viability. Added to this is the fact that tort law has aban-
doned viability as a line of demarcation for liability because it is an
illogical cut off point.36 9 The state's role in prevention of abusive
injury should not be more limited.
The argument for intervention throughout pregnancy is appeal-
ing; however, it should be rejected. Roe v. Wades "° clearly marks
viability as the point at which state interests elevate to a level ap-
proximately at balance with those of the mother."'1 Prior to that
time, the woman's array of fundamental rights is simply too formi-
dable to be overcome. Furthermore, under Roe, the woman has the
right to abortion prior to viability. This "abortion veto" of pro-
posed intervention is a powerful reason to stay the state's hand. To
extend state authority prior to viability may cause an increase in
abortion, and abortion of the fetus which the state seeks to help is
certainly not to be encouraged. Placing the point of permissible
intervention at viability harmonizes-the- rights of the woman and
the state. Pre-viability abuse and neglect will occur, but in light of
the fundamental rights of the woman, and her ability to frustrate
pre-viability intervention, it is wise to withhold the coercive power
of the state. As discussed above, the fetus itself has legally protect-
able interests in freedom from neglect and abuse - interests
which exist throughout pregnancy. Should not the state, acting to
enforce the unborn child's rights, be authorized to intervene prior
to viability? For the reasons outlined above, this conclusion should
not be reached. The woman's rights should, during this period,
control.
B. A Presumption Against Intervention
To inhibit unwarranted government intrusion into areas of pro-
tected decision-making and privacy, the law should erect a rebut-
table presumption against intervention. The state should be re-
359. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
360. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
361. Id. at 162-64. Permitting state intervention at or after viability poses serious the-
oretical problems. When does viability occur so that the state can intervene? See City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2506-07 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has stated that in the context of abortion,
the determination of viability must be left to the woman's attending physician. Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
747-50 (2d ed. 1983). Does Colautti mean that the woman, through her physician, may dic-
tate when the state can step in to curtail abuse and neglect? May the state utilize its own
physician to opine that a fetus has reached viability? May the woman be forced to submit to
an examination to determine this question? These difficult questions are left to another day.
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quired to bear the burden of rebutting the presumption and
establishing the need for action by clear and convincing
evidence. 2
C. Intervention by the Least Invasive Method
When the state seeks to intervene in the private life of a citizen,
it must do so in accordance with the constitutional principle of
least restrictive means.863 The roots of the doctrine are traceable to
Shelton v. Tucker,864 a 1960 case in which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of state action affecting first amendment rights.
The Court stated that
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose."5
In the context of prevention of prenatal abuse and neglect, "the
governmental purpose[s]" are unquestionably "legitimate and sub-
stantial;" however, because intervention necessarily invades several
fundamental maternal rights,866 it must be carried out by the least
intrusive means.867 Unnecessary restriction of liberty must be
avoided,8s and techniques which invade bodily integrity eschewed
unless alternatives are unavailable. 69 Intervention must be tai-
362. For discussion of the importance of the clear and convincing level of proof in
cases involving important rights, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination
of parental rights).
363. See generally THE LEAST RESTRICTvE ALTERNATIVE (R. Turnbull ed. 1981); J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITmUIONAL LAW 873 (2d ed. 1983); Myers, supra note
89 at 400-02. For an interesting analysis of the doctrine of least restrictive means in the
context of involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill, see Gutheil, Appelbaum & Wex-
ler, The Inappropriateness of "Least Restrictive Alternatives" Analysis for Involuntary
Procedures With the Institutionalized Mentally 11, 11 J. PsYcHATRY & L. 7 (1983).
364. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
365. Id. at 488.
366. See supra notes 282-314 and accompanying text.
367. As an example, if alleviation of fetal disorder can be accomplished through either
a relatively safe oral drug or through surgical intervention, the former intervention is proba-
bly more consistent with the least invasion principle. Similarly, if alternative surgical inter-
ventions are available and effective, and one entails general anesthesia while the other ne-
cessitates only local anesthesia, the later intervention-with its diminished maternal
risk-is the least restrictive. The principle of least invasion or restriction should apply to all
aspects of the proposed intervention, thereby reducing invasion of bodily integrity, privacy,
and other protected interests.
368. See infra case example accompanying notes 381-98.
369. See supra note 365.
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lored to minimize the degree and length of intrusion on protected
rights.
D. Medical Care Cases
In many instances, prenatal neglect will take the form of denial
of medical or surgical care needed in order for the fetus to survive
gestation.3 70 In other cases medical intervention will be desirable to
prevent or repair non-life threatening anomalies. In both situa-
tions, the substantial body of law on medical care over parental
objection comes into play.3 M The principles deducible from those
cases can be applied to involuntary medical care for the fetus so
long as it is recognized that an additional set of rights is involved,
namely, those of the pregnant woman. Her rights to privacy, free-
dom, and bodily integrity must be added to the already complex
balancing process to determine whether involuntary intervention is
warranted.
872
1. Life Threatening Cases
In cases where intervention is necessary to prevent death in
utero or soon after birth, numerous factors must be considered.
Before intervention should be authorized, the probability of fetal
death must be high, and the reliability of the mortality prediction
verifiably accurate.373 The likelihood of successful treatment must
be high.37 ' The proposed intervention must be closely examined
370. See Bross, Neglect of the Unborn Child: An Analysis Based on Law in the
United States, 3 CHULn ABUSE & NEGLECT 643 (1979).
371. See supra Section VII.
372. See supra notes 282-314 and accompanying text.
373. Absolute certainty of diagnostic prediction cannot be achieved, and should not be
required; however, before intervention can be authorized, competent medical evidence must
clearly demonstrate that there is a high probability the fetus will die unless intervention is
authorized. Even when evidence is sufficient on this point, the doctors may be wrong. A
good example is Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981). The case is discussed supra at notes 72-73 and accompanying text. Mrs.
Jefferson was at term, and presented with a condition known as placenta previa. Medical
testimony indicated there was a 99% chance of fetal death if normal vaginal delivery were
attempted. Cesarean section was recommended, however, Mrs. Jefferson objected on reli-
gious grounds. To the surprise of the doctors, "the placenta previa condition slowly cor-
rected itself before labor began, an event almost unheard of by her doctors. A baby girl was
delivered in normal childbirth." Note, Family Law-Court-Ordered Surgery for the Protec-
tion of a Viable Fetus, 5 WESTERN N.E. L. REv. 125, 138 n.89 (1982). While cases like Jef-
ferson will occur, the reality of medical error must not be permitted to stand in the way of
essential fetal treatment. As medical science progresses, errors in prediction will decrease.
374. See authorities cited at note 212, supra for standards used in decision-making in
medical care cases. See also supra note 373 and accompanying text.
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from the perspective of the unwilling mother. The risk of maternal
morbidity and mortality must be scrutinized. Intervention should
not be authorized unless such risks can be reliably quantified so
that they can be assessed in their own right and compared to the
risk of death and likelihood of successful outcome for the fetus.
The invasiveness of the procedure must be assessed, along with an
analysis of the amount of time required for successful treatment.
As invasiveness and restriction of liberty increase, the propriety of
intervention decreases. Also to be considered are the rights of the
unborn child 5 and the father." To protect the interests of the
fetus, it should be accorded party status and be represented by
counsel.87 7 When all relevant information is adduced, the court
should weigh the competing interests and rights and render a deci-
sion that is just and appropriate under the circumstances.
2. Non-Life Threatening Cases
Review of the medical care cases in which the child's life is not
at risk reveals the central factor considered by the courts is the
degree of harm the child will suffer without medical careM8 The
greater the harm, the more likely that intervention will be author-
ized. The likelihood of successful treatment and the degree of risk
are also important factors. 7 9 When the state seeks to impose invol-
untary medical care on a pregnant woman to alleviate non-life
threatening fetal disease or disorder, the balance of risks and bene-
fits is subtly altered. The state's interest in improving life is impor-
tant and appropriate, but less compelling than its interest in pres-
ervation of life.880 To justify intervention, the degree and
permanence of harm to the fetus must be substantial and certain.
At the same time, the acceptable degree of risk and imposition on
the mother is less than in life threatening cases. This is not to say
that intervention is never appropriate. It simply means that the
balance is shifted away from involuntary medical care.
375. See supra Section XI.
376. See supra Section XII.
377. Courts have authority to appoint counsel for the unborn. See supra note 51.
378. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
380. The continuation and preservation of life is basic to human nature-founded in
instinct as well as social values. The state, acting as parens patriae, has ample power to
protect the lives of young children incapable of self-protection. The social value in improv-
ing life is strong as well; however, it is less compelling than the societal interest in preserva-




Application of the principles discussed above to three case exam-
ples should be instructive. Mrs. Doe is a twenty-six year old wo-
man approximately twenty-two weeks into her second preg-
nancy."' 1 Her first child was born with hydrocephalus, 82 which
caused severe, permanent mental retardation. She has a family his-
tory which leads her doctor to fear that the fetus may also develop
hydrocephalus. Concerned about this possibility, Mrs. Doe submits
to an ultrasound examination, the finding of which is consistent
with hydrocephalic development. The physician determines that
the fetus is viable; therefore, abortion is not an option. Further-
more, Mrs. Doe wants the child, and her health and safety will not
be jeopardized by normal delivery. A repeat ultrasound during the
twenty-fourth week indicates progressive worsening of the
hydrocephalic condition. The obstetrician, in consultation with her
colleagues, concludes that the fetus will probably survive gestation,
but will be severely brain damaged unless a shunt procedure is
performed in utero. Mrs. Doe and her husband are grief-stricken
by their unborn child's prognosis, but inform the doctor that their
religious beliefs require them to decline medical intervention en-
tailing physical penetration of the body.
A few minutes later, the phone rings in the office of the hospi-
tal's general counsel. A meeting with the medical staff reveals that
[f]or the patient with hydrocephalus, surgical implantation of a shunting
device offers a reasonable hope of permanent relief from the effects of in-
creased intracranial pressure. With current ultrasound techniques, it is pos-
sible to make the diagnosis of hydrocephalus confidently in the middle tri-
mester of pregnancy . . . . Unfortunately, because of either transient or
persistent elevations of intracranial pressure, many fetuses have such severe
brain damage that a shunting procedure after delivery is often of little ben-
efit except to facilitate custodial care."s
Testing in Mrs. Doe's case reveals development of progressive
hydrocephalus. The certainty of diagnosis is very high, and is con-
firmed by repeat ultrasound. Further, the physicians concur that
there is a ninety-eight percent probability of severe brain damage
with resulting mental retardation. Based on Mrs. Doe's history and
the condition of her fetus, the doctors conclude that the child will
381. The basic fact pattern for this case example is derived from CleweU, supra note
53. The patient discussed in the Clewel article did not object to surgery.
382. For brief definition of hydrocephalus, see supra note 240. See also authorities
cited as note 141, supra.
383. Clewell, supra note 53, at 1320.
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be profoundly mentally retarded and will require continuous custo-
dial care throughout life.
Implantation of a fetal shunt is done under local anesthesia. A
small incision is made in the mother's abdomen. Using a real time
scanning device to guide her, the doctor inserts a needle through
the incision and into the amniotic cavity. The needle is positioned
against the fetal skull, and, with gentle pressure, the skull is pene-
trated. A miniature shunt is inserted through the needle into the
fetus' brain, and is left in place after the needle is withdrawn. The
shunt drains excess cerebro-spinal fluid from the brain into the
amniotic cavity, thus decreasing intracranial pressure and permit-
ting greater brain growth and development.3"
The shunt implantation procedure will be relatively safe for Mrs.
Doe. Risk of infection is present, of course, but it can be reduced
to acceptable levels. Since general anesthesia is unnecessary, its
risks are avoided. The physical invasion is minor, with little or no
scarring. The procedure is performed in a short period of time, and
she can return to relatively normal activity soon thereafter. Fi-
nally, there is no effective, less invasive treatment.
As for the fetus, there are several risks involved, including infec-
tion, further brain injury, and possible spontaneous abortion. On
the other hand, withholding treatment will lead to profound
mental retardation and disfigurement of the head. The procedure
offers a substantial probability of normal appearance and
greater-perhaps normal-neurological development. Finally, the
likelihood of successful shunt implantation is quite high.
In this case, the degree of harm inflicted on the unborn child by
parental declination of treatment is unquestionably severe and
permanent. While the child may live, its quality of life will be min-
imal, and the expense of providing lifetime custodial care substan-
tial.us If the shunt is implanted, there is a high probability that
384. See id. at 1320-21.
385. The enormous cost of caring for a severely handicapped child cannot be ignored.
See Barclay, supra note 53, at 1554. One of the authors, Dr. Maria Michejda, M.D., ob-
served that the cost of caring for children with neural tube defects like hydrocephalus is
tremendous:
In the United States, in 1979 alone, yearly expenses for each child with a neural
defect were about $60,000 and the total spending amounted to more than $200 mil-
lion annually. Estimated costs of $62 million by the March of Dimes Birth Defects
Foundation for hospitalization and private physician visits can be added to that stag-
gering figure. In comparison, costs of successful in utero surgery would be limited to
antenatal diagnostic tests and the costs similar to that of fetoscopy and a short period




the fetus will reap significant benefit. The fetal right to be born
with a sound mind and body is directly implicated, 86 and the
guardian ad litem should argue in favor of the procedure. The
state's interests, including the compelling interest in potential fetal
life, are also at work, and will only be satisfied if care is provided.
Juxtaposed against the 'fetal and state interests are those of the
mother and father. This fact situation activates the full panoply of
maternal rights because a degree of bodily invasion and loss of
freedom of movement are required in addition to imposition on pa-
rental and privacy interests. Further, genuinely held religious be-
liefs militate against intervention.
In deciding whether to require the in utero shunt procedure over
parental objection, the medical care cases provide guidance. For
example, in Matter of Jensen87 the Oregon Court of Appeals or-
dered a shunt procedure for a fifteen month old infant over her
parent's religious objection. The court observed that "[t]he differ-
ence between providing and not providing indicated medical treat-
ment here, as far as human beings can know, may well be the dif-
ference between providing or denying the child an opportunity to
enjoy a meaningful life."'88 The rationale supporting the decision
in Jensen applies with equal force to the case under discussion. In
balancing the interests it seems clear that the rights and interests
of the fetus, in conjunction with the compelling interests of the
state, should prevail.
The facts of Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Au-
thority38 9 provide another useful example of prenatal care over pa-
rental objection. Mrs. Jefferson was in her thirty-ninth week of
pregnancy and expected delivery at any time. Her physician diag-
nosed complete placenta previa, which is a condition where the
placenta is implanted in the lower segment of the uterus, com-
pletely obstructing the birth canal.3 "' The court found that
"[t]here is 99 to 100 percent certainty that the unborn child will
die if [Mrs. Jefferson] attempts to have the child by vaginal deliv-
ery. There is a 99 to 100 percent chance that the child will live if
386. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
387. 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
388. 54 Or. App. at 4, 633 P.2d at 1305. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying
text.
389. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
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(1982).
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the baby is delivered by Cesarean section ... ."I"9 Further, there
was substantial chance of maternal death with natural delivery.
Cesarean section was the least invasive procedure available.
The medical care cases dealing with life-saving therapy are ap-
posite to this situation. "Courts which have considered the ques-
tion . . . uniformly have decided that State intervention is appro-
priate where the medical treatment sought is necessary to save the
child's life. '8 9 2 The evidence was clear that fetal death would result
unless the surgery was ordered.8 93 While maternal risk in cesarean
delivery is not inconsequential, the certainty of fetal death out-
weighed that risk, and the court ordered surgery-a result that
seems correct under the circumstances.
The third example is built around neglect in a non-medical care
context.3 9' Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) is a condition caused by
heavy maternal alcohol consumption during pregnancy:
FAS occurs in 30% to 45% of infants born to chronic, heavy daily drink-
ers. Binge drinking and moderate drinking, especially in the first trimester,
carry a lower but unspecified risk. No level of consumption (high or low) has
been established that allows for prediction of damage to the fetus. Cigarette
smoking, use of other drugs, and malnutrition may have additive effects
tending to make fetal damage more severe.s9
Victims of FAS suffer varying degrees of growth deficiency, facial
deformity, and mental retardation, all of which can be
permanent.3 96
Ms. Roe has been an alcoholic and heavy smoker for fifteen
years. She is twenty-six weeks pregnant. At the beginning of her
pregnancy she stopped drinking; however, personal problems have
caused a resumption in heavy binge drinking about twice a week.
Her physician fears that the alcohol consumption will damage the
fetus. He is supported in this fear because Ms. Roe has a vitamin
deficiency, is a periodic user of non-prescription drugs, and has
given birth to a child with FAS. Unfortunately, the doctor has no
means to accurately predict the likelihood that the fetus will be
damaged. Ms. Roe steadfastly refuses to adhere to the doctor's
391. 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
392. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 742, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
393. See supra note 371.
394. This case example is derived in part from Bader & Weitzman, Fetal Alcohol Syn-






This case is distinguishable from the two discussed above. The
probability and degree of fetal harm are speculative. State inter-
vention to curtail Ms. Roe's behavior would necessarily be highly
invasive of her right to personal privacy since the only way to ef-
fectively monitor her drinking would be to keep constant watch on
her or require her to report regularly to some official. If she refused
to cooperate with such a plan, the only alternative would be to de-
prive her of her liberty397-a deprivation which in this case could
last nearly a quarter of a year. When the likelihood of injury is
speculative or relatively low, and the amount of intrusion on pro-
tected interests high, the balance tips away from intervention. Ms.
Roe's behavior is unfortunate, but the state should not be empow-
ered to stop it.898
XV. CONCLUSION
Law changes with society. As legal interests arise, the law creates
mechanisms to protect them. Developments in scientific knowledge
of fetal development continue apace, advances in fetal medicine
abound, and the future portends significant additions to the physi-
cian's ability to prevent fetal defects and treat the child in utero.
Growth in knowledge and practical ability to implement it give rise
to an array of legal interests - the child's, the state's, and the
parents' - each of which seeks recognition and protection. The
time has come for lawyers to join ranks with physicians, ethicists,
and others to articulate these interests and establish a framework
within which they can be balanced.
397. See Soloff, Jewell & Roth, Civil Commitment and the Rights of the Unborn, 136
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 114 (1979).
398. On the dangers of unwarranted paternalistic intervention see authorities collected
by Myers, supra note 89, at 428-30.
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